



Counter-Terrorism  
Centre of Excellence

# Trends and Situation Report

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2020 - 2022

# Abstract

The second EAPCCO CTCoE Trends and Situation Report covers 2020 through 2022 and highlights changing developments related to the threat and manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism in the selected EAPCCO member countries.

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
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# Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Methodology.....	1
Assigning levels of the threat.....	1
General overview.....	2
Target Selection.....	5
Burundi.....	6
Democratic Republic of the Congo.....	10
Ethiopia.....	17
Kenya.....	22
Somalia.....	24
South Sudan.....	31
Sudan.....	34
Tanzania.....	37
Uganda.....	40

## Map of the EAPCCO region identifying member countries most impacted



*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement of acceptance by the United Nations.*

## Introduction

This second Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) Counter-Terrorism Centre of Excellence (CTCoE) Trends and Situation Report, developed by the EAPCCO CTCoE with support from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) covers 2020 and 2022 and highlights changing developments related to the threat and manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism in the selected EAPCCO member countries.

The Report aims to support decision- and policymaking in the EAPCCO member countries and to aid EAPCCO police chiefs and other relevant law enforcement and criminal justice stakeholders to proactively respond to the growing threat to the

safety and security in Eastern Africa. This report selectively provides a review of the manifestation of violent extremism and terrorism in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The geographic scope of the report relates to the level of impact violent extremism and terrorism have had over the 2020-2022 period in these countries and/or the increasing escalation of the threat in neighboring countries. The review of the incidents and trends in the selected countries, however, is not an indication that other EAPCCO member countries are not confronted by the threat.

## Methodology

A database of terrorism- and violent extremism-related incidents on the African continent was independently developed using open-source information, including newspaper articles and online publications. Databases of incidents developed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) developed by the University of Maryland and The Armed Conflict Location & Event

Data Project (ACLED) were used to ensure the best possible data accuracy and consistency. Due to the lack of media coverage in remote areas, smaller incidents may not have been reported by major media outlets. Additional information was also sourced from UN expert groups for the DRC and Somalia, in addition to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Group (1267 Monitoring Group).

## Assigning levels of the threat

The threat presented by violent extremism and terrorism within individual member countries, as well as the broader region, is diverse. Added to this complexity is the growing linkages between violent extremist and terrorist groups outside Eastern Africa. This development demonstrates that violent extremists and terrorists plan, operate, and cooperate beyond geographic groupings and divides. Instead, terrorist groups use these divides to their advantage, especially when they limit cooperation and the coordination of counter-initiatives.

In response to this growing reality, EAPCCO and the CTCoE increased cooperation with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Regional Counter-Terrorism Centre (SADC RCTC). Considering that the Islamic State in Somalia, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; UNSC-listed, CDe.001) or Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP; not listed) in the DRC in Uganda, and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ; not listed) in Mozambique

are increasingly connected through their allegiance or affiliation with Da'esh, and are active in recruiting members in neighboring countries, the cooperation between Southern and Eastern African countries is crucial to disrupting travel, financing, and knowledge transfer networks.

In addition to these Da'esh affiliated groups, Al-Shabaab (UNSC-listed, SOe.001), an Al-Qaida affiliate, continues to present an increasing threat to Somalia, its neighboring countries – especially Kenya and Ethiopia – and beyond. The threat presented by these organizations manifested in acts of terrorism as well as through active insurgencies in Somalia, and the DRC, in addition to Mozambique (which is not included in the report as it is not an EAPCCO member country).


Furthermore, numerous militias and armed groups exploit religious and/or ethnic identities and threaten local communities, destabilizing a specific area within a country and/or contributing to instability in a neighboring country due to weak border security. Armed groups may also associate with other violent extremist and terrorist organizations based on shared identities. The association of ADF and Mayi Mayi Malaika in the DRC, based on a shared religious identity, is one such example. While not listed as terrorist groups by the UN Security Council, armed groups and militias are a main source of security-related incidents in some countries and their

activities have a direct bearing on the overall threat landscape.


During the surveyed period, some countries experienced deteriorated domestic stability, with attacks directed against civilian populations. Furthermore, countries in the region also experienced periods of electoral violence during 2020 and 2021. While protests and violent disruption of political meetings and rallies can be separated from acts of terrorism, its other manifestations, especially assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings, present a greater challenge.

### General Overview

Following the 2654 incidents reported in 2020, the number of incidents decreased by 20.76% to 2103 attacks. This positive trajectory was reversed in 2022 when attacks escalated to 4888 incidents – an increase of 132.43%.




**FIGURE 1:**  
Incidents recorded between 2020 and 2022 in Eastern Africa




Somalia recorded the largest increase from 30% of attacks being executed in 2021 to 46% of attacks in 2022, becoming the most targeted country in the region, followed by the DRC, Ethiopia, and Kenya.


**FIGURE 2:**  
Most targeted countries in 2021



**FIGURE 3:**  
Most targeted countries in 2022




The magnitude of Al-Shabaab’s renewed emphasis on Somalia becomes apparent when considering that attacks in the DRC increased with 125.03% in 2022, and yet in comparison the number of attacks decreased with 1% from 36% in 2021 to 35% in 2022.






Although the modus operandi and target selection in the countries under review will be discussed below, it is important to note that firearms remained the preferred weapon of choice. Between 2020 and 2022, the difference between the use of firearms (majority) and explosives was 194.83%. The use of firearms increased by 90.05% between 2020 and 2022, with an increase of 161.8% between 2021 and 2022. Despite this

difference, it is important to note that while the use of firearms decreased by 27.41%, the use of explosives continued to increase, despite the overall drop in attacks between 2020 and 2021. Attacks involving the use of explosives increased by 111.43% between 2021 and 2022 and an overall increase of 128.57% between 2020 and 2022.



Furthermore, in addition to the overall reduction of attacks during 2021, assassinations by firearms continued to increase (see Figure 6). While indiscriminate attacks using firearms continued, the specific targeting of government officials especially during electoral cycles, the killing of elders and prominent community leaders, and off-duty security personnel escalated in 2022 (see Figures 7 and 8).




Notwithstanding the fact that firearms are the preferred weapon of choice being used as the sole weapon or in combination with machetes and/or knives and explosives, the use of IEDs continued to increase. The growing use of explosives, including artillery and hand grenades, in addition to IEDs escalated in 2022, in countries previously targeted – for example, Somalia – but also in new areas, specifically in Uganda.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For more information on the use of IEDs, please see EAPCCO CTCoE Study 2/2023: The Manifestation and Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices in Eastern Africa. <https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/ct-issue-papers/>




**FIGURE 9:**  
Use of explosives




### Target selection

During 2020 and 2021 attacks were predominately directed against civilians. This trend however changed in 2022 with most attack directed against security forces, despite a small escalation (26.39%) in attacks against civilians in 2022. In contrast, attacks directed against security forces escalated with 563.28% in 2022, after a decreasing trend between 2020 and 2021. This change in target selection was especially evident in Somalia as will be discussed under the country profile.

**FIGURE 10:**  
Target selection of attacks in Eastern Africa






# Burundi




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


Political-related violence were attributed to the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (Imbonerakure Faction; not listed) or CNDD-FDD and the Resistance to the Rule of Law in Burundi (RED-TABARA; not listed) while unknown attackers were responsible for most attacks.

**FIGURE 11:**  
Incidents recorded between 2020 and 2022 in Burundi




**FIGURE 12:**  
Map of most affected regions in Burundi



Following the decreasing trajectory noted in 2020, the use of explosives – hand grenades – increased with 37.5% in 2021 to decrease by 68.18% in 2022 to the lowest level in years.

**FIGURE 13:**  
Modus operandi in Burundi




Hand grenade attacks are predominately directed against community members (54%), followed by attacks against commercial targets or areas frequented by civilians. In a coordinated spree of five hand grenade attacks on 25 May 2021 an estimated seven casualties were reported. The intended objective was to cause as many casualties as possible with hand grenades directed at three bus stops at 19:00 within a five-minute period in Bujumbura. The first attack was at the Cotebu bus stop in the Ngagara neighborhood, the second took place at the Permanence bus stop between the neighbourhoods of Bwiza and Buyenzi, and the last two other explosions were recorded further south, near the Musaga bus stop in the centre of town.<sup>2</sup>

In another attack in the evening of Sunday 19 September 2021, two people were killed and twenty-five injured, when a hand grenade detonated inside a bar in Gitega, at the junction of the Gitega-Ngozi-Muyinga road in central Burundi. During the same

period, on 23 September 2021 at around 19:00 a hand grenade was hurled at the home of Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron Ndayishimiye (commander of the 212th battalion operating in the Rukoko wildlife reserve in Bubanza province), seriously injuring the officer but killing his wife and worker. The following evening of 20 September 2021 simultaneous hand grenades attacks were executed in Bujumbura when at least four grenades targeted a bus park of the old central market - central market in Rohero - in Bujumbura, a group of fish sellers near the Jabe market in the Bwiza zone. This mass casualty event was again aimed at causing mass injuries, as it was again executed at 19:00.<sup>3</sup>

The target selection continued in 2022 despite the significant drop in attacks. For example, during the evening of Saturday 16 April 2022, a policeman was fatally wounded in a hand grenade attack in the hotel bar of Alpha Hotel at the Kavogero quarter, in Kirundo province (northern Burundi).<sup>4</sup>



In addition to the physical manifestation of attacks, ADF operatives in Burundi have also recruited Burundian nationals to join ADF in the DRC. Consequently, according to the DRC Monitoring Group, advancements in the construction of IEDs were attributed to the involvement of ADF

combatants from abroad, including from Burundi. Two ADF combatants killed during clashes with DRC defense forces on 28 December 2020 were allegedly from Burundi.<sup>5</sup> Suspected extremists have also entered the DRC via Burundi.

2 Geraldine Boechat. Burundi: Several dead in Bujumbura after grenade attacks. 27 May 2021. <https://medafricatimes.com/23443-burundi-several-dead-in-bujumbura-after-grenade-attacks.html#:~:text=Bujumbura%20was%20hit%20by%20several,were%20killed%20and%20dozens%20injured>

3 SOS-Torture Burundi. Report N° 302 Published on 25 September 2021. <https://sostortureburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Weekly-report-no-302.pdf>

4 SOS-Torture Burundi. Report N° 332 Published on 23 April 2022. <https://sostortureburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Weekly-report-no-332-1.pdf>

5 United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2021/560, 10 June 2021.

For example, Hamisi Issa Shahame, a Tanzanian national with a temporary South African residence permit who was arrested on 20 October 2017 entered the DRC via Burundi.<sup>6</sup>

It is however not only the ADF who launched recruitment initiatives in Burundi. According to the DRC Monitoring Group, M23 (UNSC-listed, CDe.006) directed recruitment campaigns at Banyamulenge youth living in Burundi, Kenya, and Uganda since late 2021 for these young recruits to be sent to M23 camps in the DRC.<sup>7</sup>


Burundi is also being used to facilitate the smuggling of large volumes of gold and Redwood from Misisi, Baraka and Kalemie before being export to Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia, that in turn funds rebel groups in the DRC.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2022/479, 10 June 2022.


<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2021/560, 10 June 2021.



# The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)




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
Following the 2015-2020 Trends and Situation Report, the situation in the DRC, in particular the eastern part of the country deteriorated with the affected provinces being North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Tanganyika and Maniema. A number of terrorist and armed groups are active in the DRC, of which the Allied Democratic Force (ADF; UNSC-listed, CDe.001), March 23 Movement (M23; UNSC-

listed CDe.006), the different Mayi Mayi factions, Cooperative for Development of Congo (CODECO; not listed) factions, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR; UNSC-listed, CDe.005) factions, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA, UNSC-listed, CFe.002), Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC) splinter groups, etc., were responsible for an increase of 125% between 2021 and 2022.

**FIGURE 15:**  
Attacks in the DRC 2020-2022




**FIGURE 16:**  
Map of most affected regions in the DRC



*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement of acceptance by the United Nations.*

**FIGURE 17:**  
Most active groups in the DRC



Since 2020, attacks involving the ADF or since its name change Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahideen (MTM) or Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP) increased from 167 attacks in 2020 to 244 attacks in 2021 (46% increase) and 406 attacks in 2022 (66.39% increase) or an increase of 143.11% since 2020. While its area of operations is concentrated in North Kivu and Ituri, its expansion to areas less affected in the past is raising concern. The escalating indiscriminate use of explosives, the ADF increasingly demonstrated its commitment to target civilians with sixteen of these attacks directed at places frequented by civilians. Thirty-six incidents involving the use of IEDs were reported during the period between November 2020 and March 2021 in North Kivu and Ituri, with eighteen attacks recorded in the last two months of 2020.<sup>9</sup>

For example, on 27 June 2021, the ADF detonated an IED at Saint Emmanuel Catholic Church in the Butsili neighborhood of Beni city in North Kivu killing two women, marking the first occasion a church has been targeted in Beni. A second device, this time carried by a suicide bomber detonated at a bar in the Mabakanga neighborhood ISCAP claimed responsibility for the two attacks.<sup>10</sup>

Since the attack on 27 June 2021, the ADF escalated its target selection attacking churches for the propagandist value in an attempt to strengthen their image of fighting unbelievers for the sake of their interpretation of what is acceptable for God (Allah). For example, in accepting responsibility for the attack, the statement reads as follows: *“By the blessing of God, one of our squads was able to blast an IED inside a Christian church in Butsili neighborhood in Beni city. Two were killed and many were injured and the church was damaged, and thanks to God.”*<sup>11</sup>

The message following the attack on 15 January 2023 directed at a Protestant church in Kasindi reads as follows: *“By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate were able to plant and detonate*

*an explosive device inside a church of unbelieving Christians in the town of Kasindi in the region Beni in eastern Congo, which resulted in the killing of about 20 Christians, and the wounding of dozens of others with varying degrees of severity. And let the Congolese forces and their allies know that their successive campaigns against the Mujahideen will only lead to more failure and loss, God willing.”*<sup>12</sup>

Following an attack on Mukondi village in March 2023, the following statement was released on Amaq News Agency, a Da'esh publication: *“Thanks to God, soldiers of the Caliphate attacked the Christian village of Mukondi in the Beni area the day before yesterday, where the mujahideen stormed the village, targeting a grouping of Christians with various weapons, resulting in the deaths of at least 35 Christians and the wounding of others, and the mujahideen burned down Christian houses inside the village and captured some of their possessions, and then returned to their positions safely.”*<sup>13</sup>

On 25 December 2021 (on Christmas), a member of the ADF carried out a suicide bomb attack at the entrance of a bar/restaurant on Nyamusi boulevard in the city of Beni. At least 8 people (including the assailant) were killed. The victims include a FARDC, the DRC's army, soldier (assumed off-duty), along with his two daughters, among others. At least 13-20 people were injured, two were mayors of Beni communes. Sources suggest the suicide bomber wanted to infiltrate the bar and when rejected, detonated the explosive.<sup>14</sup>

The ADF executed its first suicide attack on 7 April 2022 at 19:40 in Goma, killing six people instantly while injuring many others. What made this incident of particular importance was that a female Tanzanian national was responsible for detonating the suicide vest in a bar in Katindo military camp. This suicide vest was very similar to the device used in the 25 December 2021 bombing in Beni.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2021/560, 10 June 2021. p. 65.

<sup>10</sup> The Observers. DR Congo: A devastating series of bombings raises tensions in Beni. 1 July 2021. <https://observers.france24.com/en/africa/20210702-democratic-republic-congo-unprecedented-suicide-bombing-beni-raises-tensions>

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2022/479, 10 June 2022.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> AlJazeera. Several killed in suicide bomb attack at DR Congo restaurant. 25 December 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/25/dr-congo-blast-restaurant-beni-adf>

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/95, 13 February 2023



On 3 October 2022, the ADF claimed responsibility for an IED attack in a movie theatre frequented by Christians in Butembo (Butembo, North-Kivu). 14 people were injured in the incident.<sup>16</sup>


In addition to these perpetrator-initiated or command-initiated IEDs, the ADF also used victim-initiated devices directed against farmers to prevent civilians from working their land, and/or to force farmers and local communities to leave the affected area and/or to prevent farmers from harvesting.<sup>17</sup> This intimidation tactic also has tragic consequences to the wellbeing of local communities, including children.

For example, on 27 July 2021, a group of children were killed by a device left by the ADF, in the village of Kinyanjojo (Irumu, Ituri), locality of Boga.<sup>18</sup> Again, on 12 September 2021, one person was killed while farming and another one was injured following the explosion of an IED that was planted by the ADF in the village of Ntoma, near Halungupa (Beni, North Kivu). Targeting farmers to the financial benefit of armed groups are not limited to the ADF, according to the DRC Monitoring Group in 2021, thirty-one cocoa farmers from Beni and Rwenzori did not harvest their crops in 2020 and early 2021 for fear of armed attacks by ADF, Mai-Mai, and unidentified armed assailants.<sup>19</sup>

The ADF also adopted the tactic of booby-trapping the bodies of soldiers killed by the ADF and left to be recovered. For example, an IED detonated on 28 January 2021, targeting a FARDC soldier who was evacuating the abandoned corpse of a man killed by ADF in Budaki/Kainama. According to the FARDC soldier, the IED was hidden on the corpse and activated when it was moved.<sup>20</sup> In another incident on 29 September 2021, a man was injured after an IED, presumably planted on the body of the deceased in an IED by the ADF on 26 September, exploded in the village of Mulwa (Beni, North Kivu). The victim, accompanied by the FARDC, was in the village to recuperate the body of person who was killed by the earlier explosion.

In contrast to previous years, during 2022, the ADF also became bolder in its attacks against security forces. While the organization claimed responsibility for three attacks involving the use of explosives in 2021, during 2022, the ADF increasingly engaged with security forces during attacks directed at villages but also as a result of targeted assaults. Consequently, attacks specifically directed against security forces and its facilities increased by 11% in 2022, while engagements with security forces following attacks on villages equally increased. The category 'paramilitary' makes reference to retaliatory clashes between armed groups.

**FIGURE 18:**  
ADF target selection 2021 and 2022



<sup>16</sup> Gérard Dawa. DRC: Islamic State claims responsibility for Butembo attack that injured 14 people. Afro Impact, 5 October 2022. <https://www.afro-impact.com/en/drc-islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-butembo-attack-that-injured-14-people/>

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2021/560, 10 June 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Strategic Intelligence Service. 3 Children Killed in ISCAP IED Explosion In Kinyajojo Village in the Ituri Province of DRC. 29 July 2021. <https://intelligencebriefs.com/3-children-killed-in-iscap-ied-explosion-in-kinyajojo-village-in-the-ituri-province-of-drc/>

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

In one of these attacks, on 10 August 2022, a group of approximately eighty ADF members supported by Mayi Mayi clashed with police guards and FARDC at the Kakwangura prison in Butembo in Northern Kivu to release 874 prisoners. According to subsequent reports, 525 prisoners were re-arrested two weeks after the prison break. Security forces explained that attackers infiltrated the city from the Mwalika valley, a part of Virunga National Park approximately 30 kilometers northeast of Butembo.

Since the late-1990s, the ADF maintained several camps in the Mwalika valley serving as the primary site where new recruits are inducted and trained.<sup>21</sup> The affiliation between the ADF and Mayi Mayi Malaika was reported before the death of Sheikh Hassan, the leader of Mayi Mayi Malaika since both groups are Muslim. Following Hassan's death, Meddie Nkalubo sent two ADF members to meet Mayi-Mayi Malaika leadership in 2022 in order to propose collaboration between the two groups. Meddie Nkalubo further gave instructions to host individuals coming from Salamabila in 2022 while transiting through Goma before joining ADF camps.<sup>22</sup>

On 6 September 2022, an IED exploded in front of the National Agency Intelligence (ANR) bureau in Butembo - Bulengeru (North-Kivu). The device was remotely detonated with a mobile phone, injuring two people, including the head of the ANR office and a visitor. Police announced the arrest of the perpetrator on 4 October 2022.<sup>23</sup>

The most devastating incidents however remains attacks directed against villages resulting in the deaths of civilians – young and old – using firearms, knives and machetes and subsequent beheadings and mutilations. It is also during these raids the ADF forcefully recruit new members.

In addition to the ADF, M23 resumed its activities in late 2021 claiming the DRC government did not

respect the 2013 peace agreement to facilitate the reintegration of demobilized fighters. M23 is active in the North Kivu province, specifically within the Virunga National Park, Rutshuru, Rumangabo, and the tri-border area with Uganda and Rwanda. At the start of its campaign in November 2021, the M23 clashed with FARDC and the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN). Although communities were not specifically targeted, civilians were killed during these clashes resulting in massive displacements. M23 was, however, responsible for looting civilian houses.

Attacks executed in 2022 were predominately (76%) directed against security forces, while 22% of attacks focused on civilians. However, on 16 August 2022, M23 attacked the Rwanguba hydroelectric station (currently under construction) in Virunga National Park (Mukarange locality, North Kivu). This 28-megawatt hydropower plant will be the largest energy supplier in eastern Congo when completed in 2024. As a result of the artillery attack, equipment, workshops, and housing for workers were damaged, causing injury to five FARDC and five civilians. Assaultants allegedly also fired shots at the ambulance transporting the injured.<sup>24</sup>

While most of this type of artillery attack are directed against security forces, including United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) positions, the indiscriminate nature of these attacks the civilian population often find themselves in the middle of confrontations between M23 and Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). For example, on 20 October 2022, M23 and FARDC clashed for days in Rangira (Bwisha, Rutshuru, North Kivu) leading to mass displacement. During artillery (mortar) attacks directed at FARDC positions close to villages, M23 often also hit civilians as was the case in Rangira when shells were fired from Mukarange and Shwema hills.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Caleb Weiss and Ryan O'Farrell. Islamic State conducts second major prison break in Congo. The Long War Journal, 15 August 2022. <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/08/islamic-state-conducts-second-major-prison-break-in-congo.php>


<sup>22</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

<sup>23</sup> Reuters. Homemade explosive device in east Congo injures at least 10. 4 October 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/homemade-explosive-device-east-congo-injures-least-three-2022-10-03/>

<sup>24</sup> Reuters. Eastern Congo attacks kill civilians, hit major power plant. 17 August 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eastern-congo-attacks-kill-civilians-hit-major-power-plant-2022-08-17/>

<sup>25</sup> UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Democratic Republic of the Congo - North Kivu, Flash Update #2: Populations Displacement in Rutshuru Territory. 23 October 2022. <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-north-kivu-flash-update-2-populations-displacement-rutshuru-territory-23-october-2022>

**FIGURE 19:**  
Target description of M23 attacks in 2022




Sixty different Mayi Mayi – referring to any community-based self-defense groups – are often led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads, and politically motivated fighters<sup>26</sup> were implicated in 247 attacks predominately directed against civilian targets, and from 2022, attacks against security forces, commercial, humanitarian and individuals in community leadership positions (referred to as 'government') targets increased. On 7 February 2021, members of the Mayi Mayi raided a hotel in the TP 32 suburb of Mambasa's trading center (Mambasa, Ituri), which allegedly serves as the headquarters of a

Chinese mining company. According to reports, the militiamen killed one or two civilians and wounded one or two others.

Concern was also raised by the DRC Monitoring Group that the Mayi Mayi, with particular reference to the Malaika faction is forging links with the ADF as described above. Explaining the different militia groups extends well beyond the focus of this report. It is important though to highlight the magnitude and consequences of a need to develop counter-measures in response to armed groups settling in and using eastern DRC as a staging ground following displacement from neighboring countries.

**FIGURE 20:**  
Target description of Mayi Mayi factions



<sup>26</sup> Kitwe Mulunda Guy. Mai-Mai Militia and Sexual Violence in Democratic Republic of the Congo. International Journal of Emergency Mental Health and Human Resilience. <https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/maimai-militia-and-sexual-violence-in-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-1522-4821-16-130.php?aid=31892>


The Cooperative for the Development of the Congo (CODECO) was established to protect the Lendu tribe from the Hema, a rival tribe, as well as against DRC security forces it alleges is not acting in local interests.<sup>27</sup> Since the death of leader of CODECO, Justin Ngudjolo in March 2020 the organization split and transformed into several militias due to internal conflict and strategic ambition of individuals, but also to position themselves for negotiations with the government. A 202% increase in attacks involving CODECO factions were recorded between 2021 and 2022, from 111 to 336 incidents. While most of these attacks were directed against civilians, attacks against security forces and commercial targets increased.

For example, between the period June 2020 till April 2021, CODECO factions attacked six of the seven gold mines in Djugu, Irumu and Mambasa territories belonging to individual Chinese investors. According to the Congolese Mining Code and military regulations the presence of FARDC members at mining sites is illegal.<sup>28</sup> Within five days in June 2021 two mines were attacked. On 2 June 2021, the

Cooperative for Development of Congo: The Good Temple of God (CODECO-BT; not listed), in coalition with the Force Patriotique et Integrationniste du Congo (FPIC; not listed), executed nine to twelve miners, including six women, in the mining site of Exode (Djugu, Ituri). Three people, including two children, were abducted. Days later, on 5 June 2021, the Cooperative for Development of Congo: Union of Revolutionaries for the Defense of the Congolese People (CODECO-URDPC; not listed) kidnapped between twenty-five and thirty-five miners, injuring some of them, in the mining area of Bakobi (Djugu, Ituri). The armed group also stole money and goods.<sup>29</sup> This trend continued into 2022. For example, in August 2022 CODECO attacked a mining site a few hundred kilometers north of Virunga in Ituri province, killing about 10 civilians and four soldiers.<sup>30</sup>

The most devastating mass-casualty events remain attacks against civilian villages. For example, in an attack on Mbidjo village, in Djugu on 9 September 2022, CODECO members opened fire and burnt houses resulting in seventeen deaths, including seven women, eight men and two children.<sup>31</sup>

**FIGURE 21:**  
Target description of CODECO factions




<sup>27</sup> Africa News. DRC: at least 15 dead in a new militia attack in Ituri. 29 August 2023. <https://www.africanews.com/2023/08/29/drc-at-least-15-dead-in-a-new-militia-attack-in-ituri/>

<sup>28</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023.

<sup>29</sup> Spearfish Security. 1-15 June 2021 Bi-Weekly Report. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5aff41b94cde7a581ecf38a4/t/60cc76755f3d8945be7206dd/1624012406388/DRC+-+Spfish+Bi-weekly+Newsletter+1-15+June+2021.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> Reuters. Eastern Congo attacks kill civilians, hit major power plant. 17 August 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/eastern-congo-attacks-kill-civilians-hit-major-power-plant-2022-08-17/>


<sup>31</sup> Chief Bisong Etahoben. 17 Killed as CODECO Rebels Attack Village In Northeast DR Congo. 10 September 2022. <https://humanglemedia.com/17-killed-as-codeco-rebels-attack-village-in-northeast-dr-congo/>



# Ethiopia




*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.*



Since 2020 the security situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated, with the Ethiopian security forces and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in an open conventional conflict. Since the focus of this Report is to highlight incidents associated with acts of terrorism, attacks directed against security forces will be excluded.

**FIGURE 22:**  
Attacks in Ethiopia 2020-2022




Al-Shabaab's incursion on 20 July 2022 into Ethiopia during the period under review sounded alarm for policymakers and practitioners alike as an estimated 2,000 fighters managed to advance more than 150 kilometers into Ethiopian territory. Using the conflict in the Tigray region to its advantage, al-Shabaab made its interest in Ethiopia clear. Al-Shabaab had

its sights on Ethiopia since its creation, especially since the organization's origins can be traced back to al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI). Recalling interest in a 'greater Somalia', AIAI created a network in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya, that al-Shabaab inherited.

Al-Shabaab perceives Ethiopia as a historic enemy – starting with the First Ogaden War of 1964 and ending with the most recent Ethiopian intervention in 2006 – and has been a source of Al-Shabaab's nationalistic agenda. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF – composed of ethnic Ethiopian and Somali groups) also used Somali territory as a springboard. On

previous occasions, conflict between the ONLF and Ethiopian security forces spilled over to Somali territory even before al-Shabaab was established. The fact that a larger contingent of ethnic Ethiopian nationals launched attacks from Somalia in 2022 as part of a coordinated strategy should be cause for concern in increasing the risk of attacks being planned and executed from Somalia.


**FIGURE 23:**  
Map of most affected regions in Ethiopia



Al-Shabaab was, however, unsuccessful in executing major attacks in Ethiopia with two failed plots, one against a football stadium in Addis Ababa in 2013, and one in 2014 directed at a major shopping mall in Addis Ababa. In addition to these foiled attacks, the ONLF and OLF have been implicated in numerous attacks between 2015 and 2021, while smaller al-Shabaab incursions were recorded into Ethiopia. Both the ONLF and OLF present a clear domestic agenda;

it is, however, a mistake to disregard the historic links between the different organizations – most notably between AIAI (and therefore al-Shabaab), ONLF, and OLF. The timing of the 'renewed' interest in Ethiopia should also be seen in the context of attention directed at the Tigray region, again part of a long conflict that warmed up over the last two years.

**FIGURE 24:**  
Modus operandi in Ethiopia



Excluding attacks directed against Ethiopian security forces during the military campaign in the Tigray, the TPLF was also responsible for artillery fire directed against civilian and humanitarian and targets. For example, 5 August 2021, the TPLF shelled the internal displacement (IDP) settlement in Gali Kuma of Teru Woreda in Fanti Rasu-Zone 4. It is estimated that more than 200 IDPs, including 107 children, were killed in the attack, in addition to the destruction of humanitarian aid items in addition to attacks directed against villages and towns.<sup>32</sup>

During 2022 attacks involving IEDs and hand grenades not attributed to the TPLF – no group claimed responsibility for these attacks – became more targeted. For example, on Sunday 24 April 2022, during the celebration of Easter in Ethiopia, an explosive device detonated at Shenkora Hotel in Harar town in Harari Regional State, injuring eight civilians who were in the hotel.<sup>33</sup> On 28 June 2022 four explosions were reported at 19:00 in Bahir Dar, the capital of Amhara region. In follow-up operations, the Ethiopian Police arrested six people accused

of carrying out the explosions as well as a further fourteen people, who allegedly have links to the suspects. Weapons, explosives, and communication devices were also confiscated.<sup>34</sup> On 7 December 2022, an explosive device detonated at 21:00 in a grocery store in Lemi Kura sub-city, district (Woreda) 9 in Addis Ababa that injured seven people.<sup>35</sup> On 27 December 2022, a hand grenade detonated at Hatrick Jambo House, located in Dedecha Arara Kebele, Bole sub-city of Adama city, resulting in the death of one person and injuries to three additional people.<sup>36</sup>

Attacks were also directed against other paramilitary groups. For example, on 19 March 2022, three local militia members and a 12-year-old child died when an explosive device detonated during the graduation ceremony of local militias in Bulbula Military Training center in Bulbula town. The town is situated in the East Shewa Zone of the Oromia region. East Shewa Zone shares a border with the Oromia Special Zone which surrounds Addis Ababa. Thirty-five people were injured due to the blast. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> For more information on the use of IEDs, please see EAPCCO CTCoe Study 2/2023: The Manifestation and Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices in Eastern Africa. <https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/ct-issue-papers/>

<sup>33</sup> Geraldine Boechat. Burundi: Several dead in Bujumbura after grenade attacks. 27 May 2021. <https://medafricatimes.com/23443-burundi-several-dead-in-bujumbura-after-grenade-attacks.html#:~:text=Bujumbura%20was%20hit%20by%20several,were%20killed%20and%20dozens%20injured>


<sup>34</sup> SOS-Torture Burundi. Report N° 302 Published on 25 September 2021. <https://sostortureburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Weekly-report-no-302.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> SOS-Torture Burundi. Report N° 332 Published on 23 April 2022. <https://sostortureburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Weekly-report-no-332-1.pdf>


<sup>36</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2021/560, 10 June 2021.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Security Council. Report concerning resolution 1533 (2004) Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2023/431, 13 June 2023

**FIGURE 25:**  
Type of explosive attacks



**FIGURE 26:**  
Target selection in the use of explosives



Of the 297 attacks involving the use of firearms, most of these attacks were directed against civilians (76%), while 73% of the thirty attacks categorized as ‘government’ can be classified as assassinations or targeted attacks against government officials, electoral candidates, or local leaders.

Under ‘commercial’, 69% of the twenty-nine attacks were directed against the transportation industry. For example, on 2 March 2022, gunmen ambushed a vehicle transporting visitors to the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam (GERD) around the Africa Agriculture Development area between Dangur and Guba woredas in Metekel zone, killing 20

Ethiopian military soldiers, including a high-ranking commander, and three civilians.<sup>38</sup>

Oromo Liberation Front: Shane Splinter Faction (OLF) on their turn was responsible for 28% of the kidnappings/hostage taking of drivers and their passengers in 2022. For example, on 24 June 2022, OLF Shane militants stopped at least one truck and four buses transporting civilians from Gundo Meskel to Addis Ababa in Mezemi village near Ejere town, North Shewa, in Oromia, diverted then to unknown location and held around 370 people hostages. Ethiopian security forces rescued 360 people but ten people, including two investors, remained to be


<sup>38</sup> Ethiopia Peace Observatory. Weekly Report: 5-11 March 2022. <https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/03/16/epo-weekly-5-11-march-2022/>



held hostages by the group.<sup>39</sup> On 28 September, the manager of the Muger Cement Factory in Mekoda in Adda Berga woreda in West Shewa zone and his driver in Gatira was kidnapped while they were traveling to the factory. A day later, the OLF-Shane attacked a bus carrying employees of the same cement factory, killing at least two people, and injuring sixteen

others.<sup>40</sup> On 7 December 2022, four truck drivers were abducted by the OLF-Shane in Gebre Guracha area in North Shewa zone while traveling to Addis Ababa. The group burned three of the trucks and asked for three million Birr (around USD 56,200) as ransom to release the drivers.<sup>41</sup>

**FIGURE 27:**  
Target selection in the use of firearms




● Civilians (76%)   ■ Commercial (10%)   ■ Government (10%)   \* Humanitarian (4%)

<sup>39</sup> Ethiopia Peace Observatory. Weekly Report: 18-24 June 2022. <https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/06/29/epo-weekly-18-24-june-2022/>

<sup>40</sup> Ethiopia Peace Observatory. Weekly Report: 1-7 October 2022. <https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/10/12/epo-weekly-1-7-october-2022/>


<sup>41</sup> Ethiopia Peace Observatory. Weekly Report: 3-9 December 2022. <https://epo.acleddata.com/2022/12/14/epo-weekly-3-9-december-2022/>



# Kenya



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


Following a gradual increase in attack in Kenya witnessed from 2018 to 2020, the number of attacks decreased by 15.38% in 2021 to increase by 160% in 2022. While Al-Shabaab was unable to execute a mass-casualty event in the capital Nairobi, the east and north-eastern regions of Kenya were confronted with an increase in attacks on villages, security facilities, and transportation.

Additionally, while al-Shabaab’s area of operation is predominately in the eastern and coastal areas of the country, on 8 December 2021, a suspected member of al-Shabaab detonated an explosive device inside a home in Kamloma village in Kisumu County in Western Kenya after questioning the mother, father,

and daughter on issues they did not understand, fatally wounding himself and the parents. The daughter sustained serious injuries in the attack.<sup>42</sup> Although identified as an isolated incident, this attack served as a reminder that the threat and risk of terrorism should not only be measured by the manifestation of acts of terrorism but also by the vulnerability of Kenyan nationals to be radicalized and recruited into violent extremism in areas not directly impacted by acts of terrorism – including in Western Kenya – to be operationalized in Kenya, or to participate in acts of violence in Somalia, the DRC, Mozambique and beyond. This same risk equally exists in other countries.

**FIGURE 28:**  
Attacks in Kenya 2020-2022




<sup>42</sup> Humphrey Malalo. Suspected Islamist kills two in western Kenya – police. Reuters, 8 December 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/suspected-islamist-kills-two-western-kenya-police-2021-12-08/>

**FIGURE 29:**  
Map of most affected regions in Kenya



Attacks directed against all targets escalated in 2022 with the exception of attacks directed against humanitarian targets.

**FIGURE 30:**  
Target description of attacks in Kenya



One of the most noticeable changes in modus operandi was in attacks directed against road transportation. During 2020, Al-Shabaab directed their attention to public transportation, especially busses. For example, on 1 February 2020, three people were killed and three seriously injured after Al-Shabaab attacked two buses on the Lamu-Witu road in Nyongoro area. Poor roads and a swamp in the area aids the militants to escape easily after carrying out attacks.<sup>43</sup>

In other attacks, busses were sprayed with automatic rifle fire while fleeing from the attackers. For example, on 19 February 2020, three people were killed and six injured when an estimated ten Al-Shabaab gunmen attacked a passenger bus in Mandera. While the gunmen sprayed the bus with bullets, the bus driver managed to speed off saving the lives of many passengers.<sup>44</sup>

During this period, the kidnapping of travelers were also reported. In response to these attacks, Kenyan security forces were deployed to set up multi-agency security camps while providing additional security when driving in convoys. In turn, Al-Shabaab changed tactics in 2021 by continuing to target civilian vehicles using firearms but started utilizing remote controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) – in which a device buried in or next to the road will be detonated once the vehicle reaches where the device is buried – against vehicles belonging to security forces.

However, during 2022 additional changes in the modus operandi started to emerge. Firstly, while IEDs were still predominately directed against security forces, private vehicles were also affected since IEDs increasingly became victim-initiated IEDs. In other words, al-Shabaab operatives will arm the IED without keeping a line of sight when detonating the device, instead the device will detonate when any vehicle run over the buried IED, contributing to the

indiscriminate use of IEDs. Consequently, security personnel but also ordinary citizens using roads in Lamu, Mandera, Garissa and Wajir became victims of IEDs.

Secondly, borrowing from their initial tactics against civilian vehicles, Al-Shabaab also launched direct attacks against security forces on these roads. For example, on 26 January 2022, Al-Shabaab attack a convoy that included a vehicle carrying court officials at Lango la Simba area near Nyongoro using a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) (Lamu county). Two court officials were injured during the incident as they headed to Garsen town from Kipini Mobile Court at around 18:00. The gunmen also attacked motorists travelling from Witu area.<sup>45</sup> On 5 December 2022, Al-Shabaab ambushed a group of ten police officers in Hagadera, Garissa. The attack was initiated with RPGs, PKMs and heavy gunfire in which a vehicle was damaged, and two police officers injured.<sup>46</sup> Again in a similar attack, on 21 December 2022, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacking a police vehicle between the Hayley Lapsset Camp and Garissa. This time the attack was initiated by an IED to bring the speeding police vehicle to standstill before following with an RPG and heavy gun fire. Two police officers and one civilian were killed, and one officer was injured during the incident. The attackers then set the vehicle ablaze.<sup>47</sup>

Attacks directed at villages also became a more familiar occurrence in 2022. In January 2022, fifteen people, including four General Service Unit (GSU) officers were killed and at least ten houses were torched in suspected Al-Shabaab attacks in Juhudi, Marafa, Salama, Mashogoni, Bobo-Sunkia, Milihoi, and surrounding villages, in Lamu. For example, on 3 January 2022, Al-Shabaab, launched an attack in Widho, Lamu by setting a shop and houses on fire. Three Christians gathered at a shop to pray and died when the building was torched, while two others were burned to death in their homes. A man who converted back to Christianity was beheaded.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Kenya News Agency. Three Killed and Three Injured In Suspected Al-Shabaab Ambush Attack On Two Lamu Bound Buses. 4 January 2020. <https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/three-killed-and-three-injured-in-suspected-al-shabaab-ambush-attack-on-two-lamu-bound-buses/>

<sup>44</sup> Joseph Muraya. 3 passengers killed in Al Shabaab attack in Mandera. Capital News, 19 February 2020. <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2020/02/3-passengers-killed-in-al-shabaab-attack-in-mandera/>


<sup>45</sup> Somali Forum. Western embassies issue terror attack warning in Kenya. 28 January 2022. <https://community.somaliforum.com/t/western-embassies-issue-terror-attack-warning-in-kenya/1238>

<sup>46</sup> Cyrus Ombati. Two police officers injured in ambush by al Shabaab in Garissa. The Star, 6 December 2022. <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-12-06-two-police-officers-injured-in-ambush-by-al-shabaab-in-garissa/>

<sup>47</sup> Evelynne Musambi. Suspected extremists attack police in northern Kenya; 3 dead. Associated Press, 21 December 2022. <https://apnews.com/article/kenya-somalia-al-shabab-474810287d88cb439bd595bf291dad9e>

<sup>48</sup> Leigh Pritchett. Muslim extremist groups kill six Christians in Kenya. The Alabama Baptist, 25 January 2022. <https://thealabamabaptist.org/muslim-extremist-groups-kill-six-christians-in-kenya/>

**FIGURE 31:**  
Modus operandi in Kenya



In a possible attempt not to attract attention from security forces, the modus operandi slightly changed in June 2023 when al-Shabaab attacked the villages of Juhudi and Salama in Lamu County.<sup>49</sup> Not firing a single shot, five victims were beheaded, or their throats were slit, including a secondary school pupil. Claiming responsibility for the attack, al-Shabaab claimed that it killed “six members of the Kenyan infidels and burnt down ten houses where Christians were living”.<sup>50</sup>

Exporting its strategy from Somalia to Kenya, Al-Shabaab in their attacks directed at police stations and military facilities initiate attacks by launching artillery fire, using mortar rounds and RPGs. For example, on 28 July 2022, Al-Shabaab operatives launched an attack against Khorof Harar police station that included both the Quick Response Unit (QRU) and Kenya Police Service (KPS) camps in Wajir. An estimated ten RPGs and mortar rounds were fired in the direction of the camps and communications mast. An explosive landed inside the police station just behind the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) house.<sup>51</sup>

In another attack, on 8 August 2022, Al-Shabaab militants launched a mortar attack on the Khorof Harar police station located in Konton village which blew up part of the facilities that injured two police officers. As part of a coordinated attack on the village, attackers ambushed and burnt three vehicles and five motorcycles.<sup>52</sup> This same trend continued for the rest of 2022 with attacks also targeting education facilities. For example, on 12 October 2022, approximately forty Al-Shabaab militants attacked Libehiya town in Mandera, targeting three non-local teachers and a communication mast.<sup>53</sup> On 25 October 2022, an attack was launched on Fino primary school (Lafey, Mandera), by hurling explosives targeting students, teachers, and a local member of county assembly (MCA).<sup>54</sup>

The involvement of Kenyan nationals in other hotspots of violent extremism and the ability of Al-Shabaab operatives to establish themselves in Kenya, often through local Kenyan nationals using Somalia as a springboard to terrorize local communities, is of great concern.

<sup>49</sup> Kalume Kazungu. Two killed, house torched in suspected Al-Shabaab attack in Lamu. Tation, 26 December 2022. <https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/lamu/two-killed-house-torched-in-suspected-al-shabaab-attack-in-lamu-4066874>


<sup>50</sup> Africa News. Kenya: five civilians killed, some beheaded, in Shebab attack in east. <https://www.africanews.com/2023/06/26/kenya-five-civilians-killed-some-beheaded-in-shebab-attack-in-east/>

<sup>51</sup> Manase Otsialo. Security agencies on high alert as terror group intensifies attacks. Nation, 29 July 2022. <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/security-agencies-on-high-alert-as-terror-group-intensifies-attacks-3896424>

<sup>52</sup> The Star. Two Kenyan police officers wounded in motor attacks on camp in border region. 9 August 2022. <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2022/08/09/two-kenyan-police-officers-wounded-in-motor-attacks-on-camp-in-border-region>

<sup>53</sup> Manase Otsialo. Three teachers ‘missing’ following Mandera terror attack. Nation, 12 October 2022. <https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/mandera/three-teachers-missing-following-mandera-terror-attack-3982438>


<sup>54</sup> Manase Otsialo. Pupil injured in a suspected terror attack in Mandera. Nation, 26 October 2022. <https://nation.africa/kenya/counties/mandera/pupil-injured-in-a-suspected-terror-attack-in-mandera-3998084>



# Somalia




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


Despite being the third most terrorism affected country in the world (following Afghanistan and Iraq) according to the Global Terrorism Index during 2021, Somalia witnessed a drop in the number of attacks as well as in the number of deaths. Al-Shabaab however intensified its activities during 2022 with an increase of 262.64% in the number of attacks executed in Somalia.


**FIGURE 32:**  
Attacks in Somalia 2020 - 2022



**FIGURE 32:**  
Attacks in Somalia 2021 - 2022




**FIGURE 32:**  
Map of most affected regions in Somalia



This increase in attacks can largely be attributed to Al-Shabaab’s campaign directed against security forces during 2022 to the point that 85% of attacks executed by the organization were directed against military forces and the police.

**FIGURE 33:**  
Target selection of attacks in Somalia




Since 2018 the use of explosives in Somalia were on a decreasing trend<sup>55</sup> until the end of 2021, as the use of explosives increased with 134.39% during 2022. Another trend to note is the use of assaults using firearms: during 2016 and 2017, the use of explosives overshadowed armed assaults, until 2018 to 2020 when as the use of explosives decreased, armed assaults escalated.

During 2021, tactics changed back to that witnessed during 2016 and 2017. Changes in modus operandi experienced in 2022 can however not be compared

to previous years in frequency. A number of factors may shed light onto this occurrence, including political uncertainty around the postponement of elections, followed by the end of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) mandate on 1 April 2022, bringing the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) into effect. A gradual withdrawal of troop-contributing countries is ongoing while bases are handed over to Somali security forces. Changing the AU Mission parameters provided a psychological boost to Al-Shabaab, interpreting it as a sign of early victory.



**FIGURE 34:**  
Weapons of choice in Somalia



55 EAPCCO CTCoE Trend and Situation Report: 2015-2020. <https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/ct-situation-and-trends-reports/>



The largest increase in attacks was directed against military checkpoints (1067.74%) and bases (977.63%), followed by a 390.91% increase in attacks directed against police checkpoints.



In addition to these changes in the tactics used against security forces, there has been an overall increase (175%) in the use of SVBIED, but a marginal increase in the use of IEDs (34.93%) and VBIEDs (30%). IED attacks include the use of RCIED and UVIED attacks. The latter continued to be used in the execution of assassination attacks.

For example, on 29 August 2022, Moalim Hussein Filaweyne, the deputy Yaqshid district commissioner for administration and politics, was targeted by an explosive device fitted to his vehicle in the Bula Maxaay neighborhood in Mogadishu (Banadir).<sup>56</sup>

Attackers wearing explosive vests (BBIED) have equally been active in getting close to their intended targets during assassination plots. For example,

<sup>56</sup> The Somali Link Newspaper. Deputy district commissioner killed in car bomb attack in Mogadishu. 30 August 2022. <https://somalilinknewspaper.com/2022/08/30/deputy-district-commissioner-killed-in-car-bomb-attack-in-mogadishu/>

23 March 2022, Amina Mohamed, a member of parliament campaigning in Beledweyne in central Somalia was killed by a suicide bomber before a second blast was caused by a VBIED in front of this city's main hospital, where the injured in the first attack were taken.<sup>57</sup>

On 27 July 2022, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest targeting Abdullahi Ali Wafow, the district commissioner of Marka in (Lower Shabelle), killing fourteen people, including district commissioner and the suicide bomber, while eight others were injured.<sup>58</sup> Two days later, on 29 July 2022, an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated his explosive belt killing Hassan Ibrahim Lugbur, the justice minister in the South West State and his son in Wadajir neighborhood in Baidoa town (Bay). At least seven people were also injured.<sup>59</sup>

On 7 November 2022, two Al-Shabaab SVBIED launched an attack at 05:00 on government security forces (SNA) and Habar Gedir clan militia base in Qaayib village (Galgaduud), followed by heavy exchange of gunfire and RPGs from both sides. Al-Shabaab fighters briefly took control of the village, during which they destroyed a telecommunications mast. At least 33 people were killed, including two suicide bombers, and three armed vehicles were seized during the assault.<sup>60</sup>

The deadliest attack during the period under review occurred on 29 October 2022, as two VBIEDs detonated at Somalia's education ministry next to a busy market intersection, killing at least a hundred people and injuring a further three hundred. The first explosion occurred around 14:00 on Saturday at the education ministry, while the second detonated minutes later as first responders and ambulances arrived to assist the victims.<sup>61</sup>


<sup>57</sup> Deutsche Welle. Somalia twin attack: Politician killed in bomb blasts. 23 March 2022. <https://www.dw.com/en/somalia-twin-attack-politician-killed-in-bomb-blasts/a-61239115>

<sup>58</sup> Xinhua. At least 19 killed, 23 others wounded in bomb attacks in Somalia. 28 July 2022. <https://english.news.cn/africa/20220728/1b3c14e9a63f468fbc7c1d01475dcd9e/c.html>

<sup>59</sup> Mohammed Dhaysane. Bomb blast kills regional judicial official in Somalia. Anadolu Agency, 29 July 2022. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/bomb-blast-kills-regional-judicial-official-in-somalia/2648684>

<sup>60</sup> Aljazeera. Al-Shabab gunmen attack military base in central Somalia. 7 November 2022. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/7/suspected-al-shabaab-militants-attack-somalia-military-base-defence-ministry>


<sup>61</sup> Abdi Sheikh and Abdiqani Hassani. Car bombs at busy Somalia market intersection killed at least 100, president says. Reuters, 31 October 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-president-least-100-people-killed-car-bombs-2022-10-30/>



# South Sudan




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
Following the 2015-2020 Trend and Situation Report, the number of attacks in South Sudan increased with 73.33% to 130 incidents to decrease to 109 incidents (decrease of 16.15%).

**FIGURE 36:**  
Attacks in South Sudan 2020-2022



Based on Figure 33: Map of most affected areas in South Sudan in 2022 most incidents were recorded in Central Equatoria and Jonglei, followed by Eastern Equatoria, Unity, and Upper Nile.

**FIGURE 37:**  
Map of most affected areas in South Sudan




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An increase in attacks using firearms in 2021 was followed by a decrease of 17.74% in 2022. Despite this decreasing trend, the use of explosives increased with 250%. Most of these incidents involved the use of hand grenades. For example, on 23 January 2022, a hand grenade detonated at a traditional dancing ceremony in Loronyo boma (Torit county, Eastern

Equatoria state) resulting in the death of one person, while three others were injured, all men.<sup>62</sup> On 26 August 2022, an unknown assailant threw a grenade at a hotel used by senior government officials in the city of Malakal (Malakal county, Upper Nile state). The hotel was damaged, but there were no injuries.<sup>63</sup>

**FIGURE 38:**  
Weapons of choice in South Sudan



<sup>62</sup> Radio Tamazuj. Grenade attack leaves 1 dead, 3 injured in Torit County


<sup>63</sup> Radio Tamazuj. Malakal: Grenade attack at hotel, no one hurt. 28 August 2022. <https://radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/malakal-grenade-attack-at-hotel-no-one-hurt>

Attacks directed against humanitarian and healthcare workers were especially condemned. For example, on 21 May 2021, Dr Louis Edward Saleh, working at Ganyiel PHCC in Unity State under the International Rescue Committee (IRC), was killed at the health facility. On 27 July 2021, Dr Dominic Pitia, working for Care International as the Emergency Health Manager in Akobo, was found dead in his room in Jonglei State. On the same day, Mabiior Manyok Ader, working for the Médecins du Monde (Médicos del Mundo), as a clinical officer working at Pajut PHCC, was found dead in his room in Duk, also in Jonglei State. On 12 May 2021, Ms Amono Anna Clara, a specialist nurse in Reproductive Health working for Cordaid, an international emergency relief and development organization was fatally wounded in an ambush between Chukudum and Camp 15 in Budi County, Eastern Equatoria State.<sup>64</sup> On 28 February 2022, a convoy of 59 trucks carrying WFP food and nutrition assistance came under attack from armed gunmen some 30 kilometres from Gadiang, 160 kilometres

from Bor in Jonglei State.<sup>65</sup> This was however not the only attack against humanitarian convoys or against the WFP, explaining the escalation of a 57.14% increase against humanitarian targets in 2022. On 24 March 2022, unknown attackers fired upon a WFP convoy of 44 trucks between Gadiang and Yuai in Jonglei State. This was the third ambush in Jonglei State in the past four months. Three people on the convoy were killed during the attack and another was injured.<sup>66</sup> In total, 18% of attacks during 2021-2022 were directed against vehicles in transit.

In addition to the mentioned escalation of attacks against humanitarian targets, attacks against government and security forces also increased in 2022, whereas attacks against civilians and commercial targets decreased. Other than attacks directed against villages that have a clear ethnic component, discerning between those responsible remained difficult.


**FIGURE 39:**  
Target selection of attacks in South Sudan



<sup>64</sup> South Sudan Medical Journal. Humanitarian and healthcare workers killed in South Sudan. <http://www.southsudanmedicaljournal.com/archive/august-2021/humanitarian-and-healthcare-workers-killed-in-south-sudan.html#:~:text=Dr%20Louis%20Edward%20Saleh,facility%20on%2021%20May%202021>.

<sup>65</sup> World Food Programme. UNMISS and WFP condemn attempted ambush on interagency UN convoy. 1 March 2022. <https://www.wfp.org/news/unmiss-and-wfp-condemn-attempted-ambush-interagency-un-convoy>


<sup>66</sup> World Food Programme. UN World Food Programme strongly condemns third attack on humanitarian convoy in four months. 15 March 2022. <https://www.wfp.org/news/un-world-food-programme-strongly-condemns-third-attack-humanitarian-convoy-four-months>



## 2.12 Sudan




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


During 2021, attacks decreased by 35.92% from 142 in 2020 to 91 and remained unchanged in 2022.

**FIGURE 40:**  
Attacks in Sudan 2020-2022




**FIGURE 41:**  
Map of most affected areas in Sudan



While attacks using firearms were on a decreasing trend, the use of explosives were increasing. The direct manifestation of Da'esh activities in Sudan was witnessed on 4 October 2021, when four suspected Da'esh-linked militants and one member

of the security forces were killed during clashes in Jabra neighborhood in Khartoum. The day earlier, security forces arrested eleven suspects of different nationalities in a raid in Omdurman, neighboring Khartoum.<sup>67</sup>

**FIGURE 42:**  
Weapons of choice in Sudan




Most (53%) of attacks involved the use of hand grenades. For example, on 10 July 2021, attackers threw two hand grenades at al-Amir sports club in the Salbouna area in Port Sudan. Three people were killed by the grenade. A woman was also killed by the attackers as they fled the scene. A second attack on a hotel in the city failed.<sup>68</sup> In addition to hand grenade attacks, RPGs were directed against commercial targets.

<sup>67</sup> Reuters. Four suspected IS-linked militants, one Sudanese security forces member killed in Khartoum. 5 October 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-security-forces-clash-with-terrorist-cell-khartoum-state-tv-2021-10-04/>

<sup>68</sup> Al-Arabiya. At least four killed in explosion at sports venue in Sudan's port city. 11 July 2021. <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2021/07/11/At-least-four-killed-in-explosion-at-sports-venue-in-Sudan-s-port-city->


For example, on 14 December 2022, a series of RPGs were directed at Block 6 of the Balila oil field in Umm Adara (Keilak, West Kordofan).<sup>69</sup> There are no casualties. Earlier in November 2022, a section of the Khartoum Petroleum Refinery that processes Nile Blend crude oil was shut down after sabotage to the pipeline in the area of Kharasana in Keilak, West Kordofan.<sup>70</sup>

**FIGURE 43:**  
Description of explosives used in Sudan



Most attacks were executed by unknown attackers, most probably motivated by ongoing underlying tribal/ethnic conflict. In a few attacks, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) were implicated despite being officially disbanded in June 2020 remained to continue attacks in particularly South Kordofan. For example, on 14 February 2021, four armed attackers robbed twelve passengers of a commercial vehicle near Kologji, eastern Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. The vehicle was on its way from Abu Jibaiha to the Dallas gold mine of Aleri before it was intercepted at Gardoud Toro, 20 kilometres south of Kologji. Two of the attackers wore Popular Defence Forces (PDF) uniforms. During the incident, another truck was passing by, carrying a soldier that the attackers immediately shot, fatally wounding him.<sup>71</sup>

**FIGURE 44:**  
Target description of attacks in Sudan



In addition to ethnic/tribal divisions, elements also attempted to close the religious opening after the Transitional Military Council came to power in 2020 by allowing Christians in Sudan to include Sunday as the official weekend for Christian schools throughout Sudan. On 4 July 2021, a Sunday, four unidentified

gunmen attacked the Christian Affairs Minister advisor in a square next to Al-Salameh grocery area south of Khartoum. While assaulted with firearms he was threatened with his life should he continue to open churches with the Empowerment Removal Committee and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.<sup>72</sup>


<sup>69</sup> Dabanga. RPG attack on Sudan’s Balila oil field. 4 December 2022. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rpg-attack-on-sudan-s-balila-oil-field>

<sup>70</sup> Dabanga. Pipeline sabotage in Kordofan shuts Sudan oil refinery. 1 November 2022. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/pipeline-sabotage-in-kordofan-shuts-sudan-oil-refinery>

<sup>71</sup> Dabanga. Sudan soldier killed during armed robbery. 17 February 2021. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-soldier-killed-during-armed-robbery>

<sup>72</sup> Dabanga. Christian affairs advisor assaulted, threatened in Sudan capital. 6 July 2021. <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/christian-affairs-advisor-assaulted-threatened-in-sudan-capital>






# Tanzania




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Following the growing instability in Cabo Delgado, in neighboring Mozambique, southern Tanzania was confronted by the spill-over effect.

**FIGURE 45:**  
Attacks in Tanzania 2020 - 2022



One of the most noticeable attacks were executed on 14 October 2020, when Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) attacked Kitaya village a police station in the Mtwara region. An estimated three hundred attackers crossed over from Mozambique into Tanzania and looted and burned houses, shops, vehicles, and an administrative office building and killed an estimated twenty people, including two security personnel. Two

weeks later on 28 October, ASWJ attacked Michenjele village, Mtwara Region during which five people were killed and an unknown number kidnapped while attackers looted and burned homes and shops. This village is approximately 37 kilometres from Kitaya and just across the border is Nangade district that has been at the time affected by the conflict in Mozambique.<sup>73</sup>


<sup>73</sup> Zitamar. Insurgents attack Muidumbe villages as IS claims Tanzania incursion. 31 October 2020. <https://www.zitamar.com/insurgents-attack-muidumbe-villages-as-is-claims-tanzania-incursion/>

**FIGURE 46:**  
Map of most affected areas in Tanzania



*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement of acceptance by the United Nations.*

**FIGURE 47:**  
Weapons of choice in Tanzania




It was especially since the latter half of September that ASWJ escalated attacks in Tanzania during 2021. Starting on 20 September, approximately fifteen ASWJ members crossed into Mahurunga village in which they kidnapped and raped women, looted and burned shops and houses. At least one person was killed. This attack was followed by an incursion into Kiwengulo, also in Mtwara during which one woman was killed and food was looted. Consequent attacks during October and November continued to be categorized by

kidnapping, looting and the burning of property. However, during the attack on 10 December, three people from the same family were beheaded in an attack on Kiwengulo village, Mtwara. Houses and a dispensary were also burned.<sup>74</sup>

Attacks were however not limited to the border with Mozambique. On 25 August 2021, Hamza Mohamed killed four people and injured another six people

near the French embassy, including three police officers in Dar es-Salaam. The attack started as Hamza fatally wounded police officers with a pistol at a city intersection before taking their rifles and heading to the nearby French embassy where he shot the security guard. Police officers responding to the incident fatally wounded Hamza in a shootout.<sup>75</sup>

**FIGURE 48:**  
Target description of attacks in Tanzania



In addition to attacks being executed in Tanzania, the threat of violent extremism extends beyond these attacks. Without going into the origins of ASWJ, violent extremists originating from Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania played a leading role in establishing the ASWJ in Cabo Delgado, especially considering that some of its key leaders are Tanzanian nationals. For example, Abu Yasir Hassan, who headed the ASWJ at the time was a Tanzanian national, while most other FTFs are from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the DRC, Somalia, and Uganda from Eastern Africa. In addition to the involvement of Tanzanian FTFs in Mozambique, Tanzanian nationals were also captured or killed in the DRC. For example, in February 2022, four Tanzanian members of ADF were arrested in Beni, while two additional Tanzanian ADF members – one identified as Nfurusii – were killed at Kilunga near the Nobili-Busunga border crossing point the following month.<sup>76</sup>

Somali intelligence sources, however, indicated that Hamza Mohamed, implicated in the Dar es-Salaam attacks was a former member of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab who travelled to Mozambique in 2020 to join militants there. Furthermore, according to security forces in the DRC, a Jordanian national currently in custody, stopped over in Kigoma (Tanzania) for nearly two weeks in August where he may have provided training to East African nationals, before joining the ADF in the DRC.<sup>77</sup> Arrested on 18 September 2021 in Makisabo, near the city of Beni, he was allegedly in charge of the militia’s drones. According to additional reports, he was carrying a Kosovo residence permit, identifying him as a 40-year-old Saudi Arabian national.<sup>78</sup> In addition to these links, and considering that the first female suicide bomber in the DRC was a Tanzanian national, points to not only links between especially the DRC and Mozambique, but also the need to carefully consider the level to which violent extremism spread into Tanzania.


<sup>74</sup> United States Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2021: Tanzania. [https://www.state.gov/page/81/?post\\_type=state\\_report](https://www.state.gov/page/81/?post_type=state_report)

<sup>75</sup> Africa News. Tanzania: Gunman who killed four people last month was a terrorist. 2 September 2021. <https://www.africanews.com/2021/09/02/tanzania-gunman-who-killed-four-people-last-month-was-a-terrorist/>

<sup>76</sup> Kenneth Kazibwe. UPDF kills Somali ADF commander in DRC as another is arrested in Kampala. Nile Post, 16 March 2022. <https://nilepost.co.ug/2022/03/16/updf-kills-somali-adf-commander-in-drc-as-another-is-arrested-in-kampala/>

<sup>77</sup> Dino Mahtani. The Kampala Attacks and Their Regional Implications. International Crisis Group, 19 November 2021. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/great-lakes/uganda/kampala-attacks-and-their-regional-implications>


<sup>78</sup> Reuters. Congo arrests Middle Eastern national for links to Islamist militia. 22 September 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-arrests-middle-eastern-national-links-islamist-militia-2021-09-22/>



# Uganda



*The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.*



While the ADF did not claim responsibility for any attacks during 2020, Uganda experienced incidents most probably directed to electoral violence during 2020 and 2021 that is difficult to discern from incidents traditionally associated with acts of terrorism when involving assassinations, kidnappings, bombings etc. Consequently, there has been a 950% increase from two attacks in 2020 till 21 attacks in 2021 directed against individuals working for the Electoral Commission, offices of political parties, politicians, and political party supporters. For example, on 8 January 2021, Richardson Tabu, a Senior Supervisor of Electoral Commission (EC) in Charge of Pece - Laroo Division in Gulu City was kidnapped after he left office to be found on 15 January 2021, when his badly decomposed body was found in Forest


ward, 500 metres from his office.<sup>79</sup> On 9 March 2021, Diana Sylvia Nanyanzi's, councilor for Nalutuntu and Myanzi sub-counties in Kassanda district was abducted two days before her death. Again, under mysterious circumstances she was dropped off at her home at Gambwa trading centre by a driver in a saloon car before passing away hours later.<sup>80</sup> On 17 July 2021, Gladys Kamasanyu, the Buganda Road Chief Magistrate, was attacked by unknown assailants around the Greenhill School Academy as she was collecting her child's school results.<sup>81</sup> The challenge with these and other attacks was that no group claimed responsibility. Being said, it is equally important to note that not all terrorist attacks are claimed by terrorist organizations.

<sup>79</sup> Sean Musa Carter. Gulu Electoral Commission Senior Supervisor Found Dead in a Forest. Blizz Uganda, 20 January 2021. <https://blizz.co.ug/5082/Gulu-Electoral-Commission-Senior-Supervisor-Found-Dead-In-a-Forest>

<sup>80</sup> New Vision. Kassanda leaders stumped by councilors mysterious death. 12 March 2021. [https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/kassanda-leaders-stumped-by-councillors-myste-NV\\_94145](https://www.newvision.co.ug/category/news/kassanda-leaders-stumped-by-councillors-myste-NV_94145)


<sup>81</sup> Center for Public Interest Law. Can Justice be Realised amidst Attacks on Judicial Officers: A Case on the Independence of the Judiciary. <https://cepiluganda.org/news-blog/can-justice-be-realised-amidst-attacks-on-judicial-officers-a-case-on-the-independence-of-the-judiciary/>

**FIGURE 49:**  
Attacks in Uganda 2020-2022



In Western and Central Uganda, the regional threat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) presents came to realization in 2021 following years since Ugandan security forces managed to bring an end to the group's terror campaign in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

**FIGURE 5I:**  
Areas most affected by attacks in 2021




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Returning to Uganda, ADF was implicated in a series of attacks in 2021 that started on 1 June 2021 when gunmen on motorcycles attacked the vehicle of Works Minister Katumba Wamala, a former chief of defence forces and Uganda police commander, in Kisasi that caused the death of his daughter and driver.<sup>82</sup> On 8 October 2021, the ADF detonated an IED in a police station, claiming to injuring several police officers and destroying the police station, in Kawempe (Kampala, Central).<sup>83</sup> Attacks in Kampala escalated following this attack to include the detonation of an explosive

device at a restaurant on 23 October that killed one woman, a suicide attack (body-borne improvised explosive device or BBIED) on a bus near Kampala on 25 October.<sup>84</sup> On 16 November, suicide bombers executed two attacks, the first at 10:03 when one bomber targeted the Kampala Central Police station check point. In the second attack at 10:06 two suicide bombers detonated their devices along Parliament Avenue. A fourth suicide bomber only identified as Mozey was unable to detonate his device and it was at his home where police recovered an unexploded suicide vest and other related explosive devices.<sup>85</sup>

**FIGURE 52:**  
Weapons of choice in Uganda



Following increased military operations from Uganda in response to these attacks, the ADF was forced to leave areas close the Ugandan border in the direction of western Ituri. While the ADF through its operations in neighboring DRC continue to present a threat, the ADF through cells operational inside Uganda increased the risk inside the country. Ugandan authorities were however successful in dismantling parts of this threat within. For example, Abdallah Kabanda Musa, alias Mogo, the suspected leader of the ADF in Central Uganda was arrested in Katooke village (Wakiso district) in March 2022. Before joining

the ADF, Kabanda was arrested in 2015 for his alleged involvement in the 2010 Kampala attacks. After his release on bail in 2020, he made contact with Meddie Nkalubo, alias Punisher, Abul Jihad, and Mohammed Ali in the DRC. Following searches carried out in his home in Katooke village in Wamala Parish as well as in his second home in Gimbo village, Lukwago Parish, police recovered a flash drive with radical videos, and bomb-making materials that increased the suspicion that he was part of the cell responsible for assembling the suicide vests, that were used in attacks at the Central Police Station and Parliament

<sup>82</sup> Reuters. Gun attack on Ugandan ex-army chief kills daughter, driver -military. 1 June. <https://www.reuters.com/world/assassination-attempt-made-ugandan-minister-army-spokeswoman-2021-06-01/>


<sup>83</sup> Intel Portal. Uganda Alert: Islamic State claims IED attack against police post in Kampala's Kawempe Division on October 8; first ever attack claimed in country. 10 October 2021. <https://app.max-security.com/uganda-alert-islamic-state-claims-ied-attack-against-police-post-in-kampalas-kawempe-division-on-october-8-first-ever-attack-claimed-in-country/>

<sup>84</sup> AFP. Uganda charges 15 with terrorism over deadly bombings. Mail and Guardian, 24 December 2021. <https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-12-24-uganda-charges-15-with-terrorism-over-deadly-bombings/>

<sup>85</sup> Halima Athumani. Uganda Police Say Three Killed, 33 Injured in Twin Suicide Bombings. Voice of America, 16 November 2022. <https://www.voanews.com/a/deadly-explosions-near-uganda-s-parliament-central-police-station/6315067.html>

Avenue. Kabanda was also allegedly engaged in radicalisation and recruitment efforts targeting the youth to launch attacks inside Uganda. Kabanda’s brother-in-law, Kisambira Muhammad, is one of the known attackers who attempted to murder General Katumba Wamala on 1 June 2021.<sup>86</sup>

**FIGURE 53:**  
Weapons of choice in Uganda



As mentioned earlier in this section, not all attacks described as acts of terrorism are being claimed by violent extremist and terrorist organizations. For example, on 17 April 2022, an explosive device detonated as many people had gathered for Easter at a discotheque located about 150 meters from the scene of the incident, in Kyangoma village, Kkingo sub-county (Lwengo, Central Uganda). While no fatalities were recorded, the incident resulted in the damage to vehicles.<sup>87</sup> In another attack, on 23 April 2022, an IED detonated, targeting the vehicle of Dr Flavian Zeija, the Principal Judge and his security team in Kalandezi Village, Buwama Sub-county

(Mpigi, Central Uganda), resulting in four police officers being injured.<sup>88</sup> On 24 October 2022, the Salama School of Blind in Mukono (Mukono, Central) was attacked. In the subsequent fire, eleven girls were killed. This attack happened days before the planned visit of Princess Anne and her husband, Sir Timothy Laurence to the school.<sup>89</sup>

The last attack for 2022 was executed on 13 December, when the ADF killed three, including a resident of Majumba Village in Rwebisengo Town Council while two Congolese nationals employed as casual workers were killed in Rwamabale Parish.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Jaysim Hanspal. ADF bomber is arrested in Uganda after joint operation. The Africa Report, 15 March 2022. <https://www.theafricareport.com/184217/adf-bomber-is-arrested-in-uganda-after-joint-operation/>

<sup>87</sup> Uganda Weekly. Security Investigates Suspected Bomb Blast in Lwengo. 19 April 2022. <https://ugandaweekly.com/security-investigates-suspected-bomb-blast-in-lwengo/>

<sup>88</sup> Wilfred Kamusiime. The Assassination Attempt on The Principal Judge was from a Roadside Explosive Device. Uganda Police Force, 25 April 2022. <https://www.upf.go.ug/the-assassination-attempt-on-the-principal-judge-was-from-a-roadside-explosive-device/>

<sup>89</sup> France24. Children among 11 killed in fire at Uganda blind school. 25 October 2022. <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20221025-children-among-11-killed-in-fire-at-uganda-blind-school>

<sup>90</sup> Alex Ashaba. Seven suspected ADF rebels captured in Ntoroko. Monitor, 28 December 2022. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/seven-suspected-adf-rebels-captured-in-ntoroko-4068676>



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