



**Counter-Terrorism
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Trans-regionalization of Terrorism in Eastern and Southern Africa

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Abstract

Establishing a network requires years of dedication, trust, and a common purpose. For violent extremist and terrorist organizations another essential element is required: stealth or the ability to not attract attention of the security forces, as its survival depends on it. Terrorist organizations and individuals dedicated to the views and objectives of violent extremism have managed to capitalize on vulnerabilities in both Eastern and Southern Africa to expand its reach. In Somalia, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and more recently the northern part of Mozambique, or countries where the threat of violent extremism and terrorism already manifested, extremists managed to create hotbeds of activities, attracting like-minded individuals from within these regions and beyond to travel to, and participate in the conflict, train, and develop new skills, and build networks. There are also countries, like South Africa used as safe-havens, for its unique set of vulnerabilities, from where acts of terrorism are planned, facilitated, and executed.

This paper provides a keyhole picture to this network of violent extremism and terrorism in Southern and Eastern Africa and serves as an introduction intended to call on governments and law enforcement institutions to learn how terrorist organizations, capitalizing on vulnerabilities and displaying high adaptability, build networks and expand across borders, threatening peace and security in Southern and Eastern Africa.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

With the financial support from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, since 2020, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been implementing a project on supporting the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) and its regional Counter-Terrorism Centre of Excellence (CTCoE). The project benefits fourteen EAPCCO members¹ in enhancing national and regional capacities to effectively prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism, and transnational organized crime.

One of the objectives of the project is to produce evidence-based research and knowledge products, relevant for the law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners in Eastern Africa. The CTCoE developed this paper, a new installment in a series of publications addressing various terrorism- and transnational organized crime-related challenges faced by Eastern Africa,² with the support from UNODC as part of this objective.

1.2 Objective

While favorable circumstances have long existed within the continent, domestic threats have been intensifying over the last decades adding to a concern that Africa is becoming the new frontline in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Countries are worried by the growing linkages between terrorist groups in the Eastern and Southern Africa, including the proliferation of funds, intensified recruitment efforts, and terrorist tactics linked to ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida.³

In response to these alarming trends, the objective of this issue paper is to investigate the expansion of the links between terrorist organizations in Eastern and Southern Africa, namely between individuals and organizations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, as well as other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa.

While historical background is critical to the analysis of the recent developments, this paper does not intend to provide a historical account of every person associated with another organization that established links with another.



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the EAPCCO CTCoE.

- ¹ The EAPCCO members are Burundi, Comoros, the DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
- ² Please consult the section of the EAPCCO CTCoE website to explore the full range of the EAPCCO CTCoE Issue Papers: <https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/ct-issue-papers/>
- ³ United Nations, Fourteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat, 28 January 2022, S/2022/63, para16.

1.3 Methodology

In addition to available research outputs and experience, the issue paper draws on the six-monthly reports to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Committee as prepared by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities. In the past years, Central and Southern Africa, along with the Eastern Africa have garnered elevated attention in these reports, underscoring the growing concern of the international community with the increasingly volatile situation in the two regions.

1.4 Terrorist group, terrorist suspect and the international legal framework against terrorism

For the purposes of this paper, the term “**terrorist group**” denotes a group or an entity listed under the UNSC Consolidated List pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), 2253 (2015), and subsequent resolutions concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities. These groups may include individuals being reasonably suspected of being a terrorist, or being associated with a terrorist group, including foreign terrorist fighters' groups. Each country has

the authority to request listing or delisting of entities engaged in terrorist acts or associated with terrorist groups from the UN consolidated list of sanctions using the mechanisms established by the UNSC resolutions.

Furthermore, at the national and regional levels, lists of terrorist individuals and groups may have also been created in accordance with domestic laws or regional frameworks and regulations, or within the scope of the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) for those reasonably suspected of having participated in the financing, planning, preparation of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts (OP 2(e)). Hence, at the national and regional levels, the term “terrorist group” may not be limited to the entities listed by the Security Council, i.e., ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida and groups affiliated to ISIL and Al-Qaida.

While there is no universally accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism, in the context of Eastern Africa, the EAPCCO CTCoe refers to the UNSC Resolution 1566 (2004) which condemns and calls upon Member States to prevent criminal acts, which constitute offences within the scope of, and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, including acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostage, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act.

2. MANIFESTATION OF CROSS-REGIONAL LINKS BETWEEN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Although key developments will be presented per country, the cross-country and regional connections can manifest in various ways:

1. Formal association in which the organization pledges allegiance (*ba'yah*) often followed by changing the name of the organization to reflect this new allegiance. This serves as a reflection that the organization (or individual) associate and commit itself to the ideology and cause of the organization it aligns itself with.

Best described as a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between two parties, it often implies that:

- Members (fighters) may travel and participate in the activities of the other. It is equally important to note that allegiance with the 'parent' organization also facilitate allegiance with other subsidiary organizations within the continent and beyond.
- Tapping into the recruitment and financial support strategies of organizations;
- Organizations using the network established by the other in the planning and execution of attacks.

Affiliates often draw on the network and links to transnational organized crime⁴ to enable and profit from the trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling,⁵ firearms and ammunitions trafficking,⁶ as well as from the illicit trade in explosives, timber, charcoal, and other goods.

It is interesting to note that while the assumption is that assistance – financing, weaponry, capacity etc. flows from the 'parent'

organization to the subsidiary, the opposite also is true, especially when the former is under pressure (with specific reference to Da'esh).

2. Allegiance often also manifests in changes in modus operandi, or the type of attacks being launched and target selection. Allegiance with al-Qaida previously resulted in the adoption of suicide operations, whereas Da'esh was made notorious through beheadings. This does not imply that al-Qaida-aligned organizations will not resort to beheadings, or vice versa.

Furthermore, allegiances also facilitate the sharing of knowhow, especially in the construction of explosive devices. It is known that bomb builders – often referred to as 'engineers' – each have a signature in how explosive devices are being constructed. When noticing the same 'signature' in devices across theatres of operation one knows that the same builder was responsible. However, these improvised explosive device (IEDs) builders are equally involved in the training of others, resulting in devices showing signs of refinement, often similarities to devices of the trainer.

3. The reasons or the strategic reasoning behind the decision to align the organization is equally telling. Although allegiance is often interpreted as a step to add to the notoriety of the organization it is often done from a position of weakness, especially for the organization pledging allegiance. While the 'parent' terrorist group benefits from being envisaged as omnipresent, the national or regional organization is suddenly valued as a 'serious' threat. Despite this initial sign of weakness,

4 EAPCCO CTCoE Issue Paper 1/2022 Addressing the Links between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism in Eastern Africa: https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/UNODC_CTCoE_Issue_Paper_3_2021.pdf

5 EAPCCO CTCoE Issue Paper 2/2022 Addressing the Links between Human Trafficking, Migrant Smuggling and Terrorism in Eastern Africa: <https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/EAPCCO-CTCoE-Issue-Paper-2-2022.pdf>

6 UNODC Issue Paper 1/2022 Firearms and Ammunition Trafficking in Eastern Africa https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/UNODC-ROEA-Issue-Paper-1_2022-Firearms-and-Ammunition-Trafficking-in-Eastern-Africa.pdf

allegiance will manifest in enhanced capabilities and a renewed commitment to a much larger cause while attracting new membership, increased capabilities etc.

In addition to above advantages, the test will be to what extent the organization will be “allowed” to operate from both other similar organizations and

the security forces. As will be presented in Somalia, a split in the organization will place the operational capacity of the “new” organization in jeopardy because of infighting. Therefore, instead of directing attacks against government, security forces and the broader community, attacks are directed against the former “colleagues”.

3. SOMALIA



Somalia has experienced protracted periods of instability since 1991. In recent years, al-Shabaab (UNSC listed; SOe.011) and to a lesser extent Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) (not listed) have expanded their reach to countries in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The origins of al-Shabaab may be domestic in nature but the climate of growing expansion of violent extremism contributed to Somalia becoming a destination for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).

The instability was first driven by weak public institutions in Somalia with the overthrowing of Said Barre, the then president of Somalia in 1991, Osama bin Laden (deceased) presence in Sudan between 1991 and 1996 and using Somalia as an Al-Qaida safe-haven before and after the US Embassy bombings in 1998. The links to Al-Qaida also include the involvement of individuals from the region participating in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Following the attacks on 11 September 2001, many of them (including those who will form the leadership core of the group) returned to Somalia and established a training camp in Mogadishu⁷. In

addition to the international links, multiple reasons exist why Somali nationals in the country joined the organization. According to a few studies, that included interviews with the former al-Shabaab members in Somalia and Kenya,⁸ the foreign intervention of Ethiopian forces (supported by the United States), and later, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti (AMISOM troop-contributing countries) was a major factor.

Building on the narrative that started with US-led intervention into Afghanistan, and especially Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as on existing grievances and territorial disputes with the neighboring countries,⁹ al-Shabaab in Somalia presented its cause as “defending a Muslim country against foreign intervention”, disseminating calls for foreigners to join the fight.¹⁰ Somali diaspora, as well as individuals from across Eastern Africa and beyond, responded by joining the organization as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).¹¹ Al-Shabaab also attracts fighters from Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti (also AMISOM troop-contributing countries) and further afield through the Somali diaspora in the United States and Europe.

7 Will Hartley and Matthew Henman, JTIC Country Briefing – Somalia *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*, 1 September 2010.

8 See Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile. Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia, ISS Paper 266, September 2014. <https://issafrica.org/research/papers/radicalisation-and-al-shabaab-recruitment-in-somalia> and Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile. Al-Shabaab Attitudes Towards Negotiations. In Michael Keating and Matt Waldman, (eds.) War and peace in Somalia: national grievances, local conflict and Al-Shabaab. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0190947910. pp. 461-473.

9 Zoppi, Marco. “Greater Somalia, the never-ending dream? Contested Somali borders: the power of tradition vs. the tradition of power.” *Journal of African History, Politics and Society* 1, no. 1 (2015): 43-64.

10 Nick Grace, Shabaab Reaches Out to Al-Qaida Senior Leaders, Announces Death Al Sudani, *The Long War Journal*, 2 September 2008, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/Shabaab_reaches_out_t.php#ixzzITxMJA9G6.

11 Nick Grace, “Shabaab Leader Sanctioned as Zawahiri Responds to Group’s Oath of Loyalty,” *The Long War Journal*, November 21, 2008. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/shabaab_leader_sanct.php

In the case of al-Shabaab, Al-Qaida had a long history with the organization even before the official pledge of allegiance. The origins of al-Shabaab can be traced back to the 1990s, yet evidence of a closer relationship came in June 2009 when Sheikh Mustafa al-Yazid (deceased), a senior Al-Qaida leader suggested that Al-Qaida had personnel in Somalia training and operating alongside al-Shabaab.¹²

Following the death of Saleh Al-Nabhan (deceased) in September 2009 al-Shabaab expressed its growing allegiance with Al-Qaida in a video, affirming the organization's loyalty to Usama bin Laden.¹³ It was also after the death of Nabhan that Usama bin Laden appointed Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (deceased) as the leader of Al-Qaida in the Horn of Africa (previously he served as Al-Qaida's operational chief and intelligence chief for the Islamic Courts Union). At his acceptance speech during an open ceremony in Kismayo, Fazul pledged allegiance to Usama Bin Laden, also making his intentions to target neighboring countries clear.¹⁴ It was therefore not a surprise that the cell that was responsible for the Kampala bombings was referred to as the Salah Ali Nabhan Brigade (not listed).¹⁵

Abnaa ul-Calipha or the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) (not listed) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) (UNSC listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq; QDe.115) - Somalia was established in October 2015 and recognized by Islamic State as an official *wilayat*, or province, in December 2017 when it was called *Wilayat al Somal*. Despite Da'esh successes to attract former Al-Qaida followers and a new generation of members, the organization was less successful in its attempt to divert al-Shabaab members (aligned with Al-Qaida) to Da'esh. Instead, the split resulted in the arrest or execution of Da'esh sympathizers and former al-Shabaab members that crossed over, including al-Shabaab commander, Abu Nu'man Sakow (deceased). *Amniyat*, al-Shabaab's security and intelligence

wing, led this campaign forcing Da'esh in Somalia to Puntland.¹⁶

Operationally, the organization managed to execute attacks within Puntland predominately and Mogadishu since 2015 but it remains overshadowed by al-Shabaab. The primary purpose of Da'esh - Somalia is however to provide strategic guidance, logistics and training to Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), channeled from Da'esh core directed towards both the DRC and Mozambique, while continuing to execute low-scale attacks in Somalia.

Raising concern is the fact that the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (the Monitoring Team) noticed that: "ISCAP is evolving into a dependable Da'esh affiliate, a development discernible in the adoption of sophisticated tactics and recent operational successes... [made possible through] coordination and skills transfer between ISCAP operatives in different localities."¹⁷ During 2021 the online presence of ISCAP also increased through combining footage from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Somalia, an indication of coordination or attempts to unify the three theatres. The improvement in the quality and content of propaganda materials, was attributed to new funding and resourcing of the group.¹⁸

According to the Monitoring Team in its 2022/547 Report, Al-Karrar office or Da'esh regional network covers Somalia, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo acts as a financial hub and transmits substantial funds to Da'esh Afghan affiliate, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan (ISIL-K) (UNSC listed; QDe.161). The Al-Karrar office is based in Somalia and led by Abdul Qadir Mumin (UNSC listed; TAI.128), the emir of Da'esh in Somalia. Mumin who is from Puntland has dual citizenship of Somalia and the UK, was formerly an influential religious leader within Al-Shabaab, before pledging allegiance to Da'esh in October 2015.

12 Abu-Yazid, Mustafa. "Mustafa Abu al-Yazid's Interview on al-Jazeera." 22 June 2009.

13 *Investigative Project on Terrorism*, It's Official: Al-Shabaab Ties the Knot with Al-Qaida, 2 September 2009.

14 Bill Roggio, Al-Qaida Names Fazul Mohammed East African Commander, *The Long War Journal*, 11 November 2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/11/al_qaeda_names_fazul.php#ixzzIU8FnRBEN (accessed on 15 November 2009).

15 Bill Roggio, Uganda Attack Carried Out by Shabaab Cell Named After Slain Al-Qaida Leader, *The Long War Journal*, 15 July 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/shabaab_cell_that_ca.php (accessed on 16 July 2010).

16 International Crisis Group. "The Islamic State Threat in Somalia's Puntland State." 17 November 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-somalias-puntland-state>

17 United Nations Security Council. "Twenty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities." S2021/68, 3 February 2021.

18 United Nations Security Council. "Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities." S2022/547, 15 July 2022.

Da'esh in Somalia successfully expanded to Qandala, 75km east of Bossaso, the main port of the Somali federal state of Puntland, wins not just symbolic and propaganda value for the small group, but also the logistical advantages of an outlet to the sea, new financial opportunities, and better connections to southern Yemen.¹⁹ Al-Karrar office under Da'esh in Somalia also facilitates the flow of funds to Afghanistan by way of Yemen through the Umm al-Qura office, with a potential link to Kenya, while another asserts that the money is transferred using a cell in the United Kingdom.

Some of the funds are reportedly generated in Somalia from extortion of the shipping industry and illicit taxation.²⁰

Beyond Somalia, since the movement of Mohamed Ahmed alias Qahiye (not listed) in early 2020, via Ethiopia to Mozambique to join Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) there had been an escalation and sophistication of attacks in Cabo Delgado.²¹ Qahiye, a trainer and a bomb-builder further played a role enhancing explosive device capacities.²²

4. UGANDA



The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF; UNSC listed CDe.001) was created in September 1995, when Yusuf Kabanda (deceased), one of the leaders of the opposition to the Ugandan army (a comrade of Jamil Mukulu (UNSC listed; CDi.015), formed an alliance with Commander Ali Ngaimoko (not listed) of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU; UNSC listed; CDe.001, in Beni, in the DRC province of North Kivu. According to the ADF, based on its 1997 manifesto, the aim of the group is to overthrow the Museveni government and establish an Islamic state in Uganda.

Other sources claim the existence of a link between the ADF-NALU and Usama bin Laden, especially during the period when bin Laden lived in Sudan. Allegations were also previously made that the ADF-NALU received financial support from Al-Qaida as well as from the Tabliq group (not listed). ADF fighters were recruited from Kampala, Jinja, Iganga, Mbale, Bushenyi, Mbarara, Masindi and Hoima mainly, and in the 1990s they were operational in Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kibaale, Hoima, Bushenyi districts and, to a lesser extent, Mbarara

District in Uganda, while setting up bases in the DRC, from where they trained their forces and launched attacks.²³

In addition to pointing out its links with Khartoum, the ADF also established links with Al-Qaida and, since 2010, al-Shabaab. The arrest of Jamil Mukulu's son in Nairobi in 2011 allegedly revealed links with radical Kenyan circles, notably the Kenyan Muslim Youth Council. The attack at Mpondwe border post in Kasese district in November 1996 kicked off the ADF's next campaign, before retreating into the Congo. Over the next five years, the ADF launched attacks in many parts of western Uganda, mainly Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kamwenge and Bushenyi before being defeated in 2002.

The ADF-NALU successfully executed attacks in Kampala on 14 February 1999 when they detonated explosive devices in two restaurants. Between April and June 1999, the group launched seven attacks in Kampala using hand grenades and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Between 1998 and 2000, the attacks carried out by the group killed

19 International Crisis Group. "The Islamic State Threat in Somalia's Puntland State." 17 November 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-somalias-puntland-state>

20 United Nations Security Council. "Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities." S/2022/547, 15 July 2022.

21 United Nations Security Council. "Report pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council." S/2020/949, 28 September 2020.

22 International Crisis Group. "Understanding the New U.S. Terrorism Designations in Africa." 18 March 2021. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/understanding-new-us-terrorism-designations-africa>

23 Anneli Botha. "Radicalisation to commit terrorism from a political socialisation perspective in Kenya and Uganda." PhD dissertation, University of the Free State, 2014.

approximately 1,000 people and displaced 150,000, including 85% of the population in Bundibugo district.²⁴

Since its defeat in Uganda, the ADF retreated to the Beni region in the DRC from where the organization

restructured and launch attacks within the DRC (to be briefly introduced in the next section) while reaching out to other terrorist organizations in an attempt to rebrand itself. The result was the creation of the Islamic State in the Central African Province (ISCAP).



On 7 February 2018, Susan Magara, the daughter of a businessman was kidnapped, and 20-days later killed, despite the \$200,000 ransom being paid. This was the case that drew attention to the escalation of kidnappings and murder of young women in Kampala. It also resulted in a temporary ban on the selling of new SIM cards after investigators realized that Susan Magara's kidnappers had used 17 different SIM cards to contact her family and none of these numbers could be tracked.²⁵

Investigations led to a raid on Usafi mosque near Mengo Hill Road in Kampala on 27 April 2018, where police found weapons, as well as women and children who were being "recruited and radicalized into acts of extremism".²⁶ According to the Ministry of Interior, the mosque was raided based on intelligence that one of the key suspects in the Susan Magara murder fled to the mosque. The land on which the mosque was built, belonged to the late Ibrahim Kimera (not listed), a former ADF member who received amnesty in the 1990s. However, since Abdul Rahman Faisal Nsamba alias Abdullahaman (not listed) or Hassan Musa (not listed) managed to work Kimera out, individuals associated with the mosque adopted more radical views.²⁷ Nsamba, Mansour Kigozi (not listed) and four others managed to escape to Mozambique and were arrested after a raid on a camp in Mocimboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado.²⁸ Hassan Kato Miiro (not listed), Abbas Musa Buvumbo (not listed), Abdul Hakim Lugolobi (not listed) and Mahad Kasozi (not listed) were also implicated as members of the Usafi Mosque group that have committed several crimes, including murder, trafficking in persons, including 159 children.²⁹

Since his arrest in Mozambique, Abdul Rahman Faisal Nsamba, claims that he is a member of al-Shabaab in Uganda who left his country for Mozambique in search of Mansour and Abdul Aziz who was two of his members in Uganda but the last time he saw them was in the DRC. However, according to Mansour Kigozi he was instructed by his superiors in the DRC to travel to Mozambique to go after members who left for the country.³⁰ This is the second group of Ugandan nationals to be arrested in Mozambique: In January 2018, three Ugandans, including Abubaker Senono (not listed) who is believed to have also been a member of Usafi Mosque, were arrested in Mocimboa da Praia District in Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique.³¹

In addition to the alleged link between the Susan Magara case and the raid on Usafi mosque, Patrick Kashaija (not listed) alias Patrick Agaba "Pato" was arrested in Midrand, South Africa in possession of two passports. From Uganda, Agaba travelled to South Africa by road through Botswana. According to investigators, Agaba was suspected to be the person behind the voice that was recorded demanding from ransom from the Magara family.³²

24 Anneli Botha. *Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: radicalization from a political socialization perspective*. Lexington Books, 2016.

25 David Kangye. "The Big Hearted Girl: Revisiting Susan Magara's Murder." *Léo Africa Review*, 11 July 2019. <https://leoafricareview.com/feature/5156/revisiting-susan-magara-murder/>

26 News24. "Uganda seeks return of 'extremist' suspects from Mozambique." 31 January 2019. <https://www.news24.com/News24/uganda-seeks-return-of-extremist-suspects-from-mozambique-20190131-2>

27 Baker Batte Lule. "Was Usafi mosque a terrorist hide-out, or security front?" *The Observer*, 9 May 2018. <https://observer.ug/news/headlines/57642-was-usafi-mosque-a-terrorist-hide-out-or-security-front.html>

28 Andrew Bagala. "Uganda police want Usafi mosque imam, five others extradited from Mozambique." *Club of Mozambique*, 30 January 2019.

29 New Vision. "How the most dangerous criminal gangs operate." 16 October 2019. <https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/1508735/dangerous-criminal-gangs-operate>

30 Monitor. "ADF opens cell in Mozambique, says security expert." 31 March 2021. <https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/adf-opens-cell-in-mozambique-says-security-expert-1816954>

31 Uganda Radio Network. "Three Ugandan Terror Suspects Arrested in Mozambique." 28 January 2019. <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/three-more-ugandans-suspected-of-terrorism-arrested-in-mozambique>

32 Vanguard News. "Police: How Magara murder suspect was tracked down." 16 May 2019. <https://www.vanguardnews.ug/police-how-magara-murder-suspect-was-tracked-down/>

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Returning to Uganda, ISCAP was implicated in a series of attacks in 2021 that started on 1 June 2021 when gunmen on motorcycles attacked the vehicle of a former chief of defense forces and Uganda police commander, in Kisasi.³³ Attacks in Kampala escalated following this attack to include the detonation of an explosive device at a restaurant on 23 October that killed one woman, a suicide attack (body-borne improvised explosive device or BBIED) on a bus near Kampala on 25 October, followed by two suicide bombings on 16 November in Kampala that left four people dead and 33 injured.³⁴

According to the Monitoring Team, instructions for the construction of improvised explosive devices were sent via Telegram by Ugandan ADF mastermind and bombmaker Meddie Nkalubo alias Punisher from Madina Camp, in the DRC, who, as the ADF Head of Communications and Propaganda, is also responsible for filming and editing videos.³⁵ Nkalubo (not listed), joined the ADF around 2016, and was also implicated in the averted third attempted bombing in Kigali, Rwanda on 1 October 2021 that police, which they linked to ADF. According to recent studies, the fact that Nkalubo is from Kampala and not the western part of Uganda was categorized as a new trend.³⁶

5. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO



The second hotspot in Eastern Africa formed in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from where the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) operated since the late 1990s (along with over 100 armed groups). The ADF has re-emerged as a regional threat since the arrest of Jamil Mukulu in Tanzania in 2015, and Seka Musa Baluku (UNSC listed CDi.036) taking his place.

The ADF was placed on the sanctions list of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) and designated as a terrorist group by the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Under the new leadership – although Baluku has been a long-time member of the ADF and one of Mukulu’s top lieutenants – the group started to indicate that it wanted to align itself with Da’esh. The ADF also shifted its rhetoric, from being at war against the Ugandan government to a broader violent extremist agenda more aligned with Da’esh since 2016.

It was during this period that the ADF also changed its name to *Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen* (MTM; not listed which translates as the City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors, following online posts including a video presentation in which it displayed a Da’esh-like flag. In November 2017, MTM hoisted the Da’esh flag and pledged allegiance to Baghdadi at its base in Medina, Beni Region, North Kivu. Further adding to evidence that the ADF is forging closer links with the Da’esh, in February 2018 DRC soldiers found a Da’esh-published book on the body of a dead ADF militant.³⁷ In July 2019, MTM rebranded itself by replacing its logo with that of Da’esh.

According to some Member States, ISCAP membership consists of 2,000 local recruits and foreign terrorist fighters from Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Uganda. It is however

33 Reuters. Gun attack on Ugandan ex-army chief kills daughter, driver -military. 1 June. <https://www.reuters.com/world/assassination-attempt-made-ugandan-minister-army-spokeswoman-2021-06-01/>

34 AFP. Uganda charges 15 with terrorism over deadly bombings. Mail and Guardian, 24 December 2021. <https://mg.co.za/africa/2021-12-24-uganda-charges-15-with-terrorism-over-deadly-bombings/>

35 United Nations Security Council. “Twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.” S/2022/83, 3 February 2022.

36 Candland, Tara, Adam Finck, Haroro J. Ingram, Laren Poole, Lorenzo Vidino, and Caleb Weiss. “The Islamic State in Congo.” *George Washington University* (2021): 40.

37 Mücahid Durmaz. “Is DAESH making inroads in DR Congo?” TRT World, 26 April 2019. <https://www.trtworld.com/africa/is-daesh-making-inroads-in-dr-congo-26178>.

unclear how the foreign fighter elements and the local fighters from the Allied Democratic Forces and MTM had been integrated into ISCAP and the functions they performed.

The impact of the ADF adopting its ideology under the leadership of Seka Musa Baluku becomes clearly visible between 2017 and 2018 with an increase in attacks of 504.76%, followed by 43.31% between 2018 and 2019 and 43.96% between 2019 and 2020. Overall, the ADF's attacks in the DRC increased by 385.19% between 2015 and 2020. While small arms and light weapons are historically the most preferred weapon of choice by violent extremists/terrorists, the ADF is the only organization that made use of explosives in the DRC.

Twenty-three attacks using explosives were recorded during the period under review, with most of these attacks directed against security forces. Although the ADF, or rather MTM is expected to be responsible for ten of these attacks, a concerning trend emerged in 2019 as the organization started to direct attacks using hand grenades against civilian targets. Between 2018 and 2019, the use of knives increased with 357.14%, followed by a further increase of 134.38% between 2019 and 2020. This dramatic increase was associated with a growing number of beheadings associated with the ADF that by 2019 fully operated under the ISIL flag.³⁸

On 18 April 2019, Da'esh claimed responsibility for its first attack in the DRC and declared it the "Central Africa Province" of the "Caliphate", or Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The assault took place on 16 April during which two Congolese soldiers and a civilian were killed in a shootout. According to MONUSCO the attack took place in Bovata, near Beni and close to the border of Uganda.³⁹ Since then, ISCAP launched a campaign of attacks in the DRC, leading to the DRC government declaring a "state of siege".

Members of ADF are historically from Uganda (western part, neighboring the DRC) and the DRC. However, according to the Monitoring Team there has been a significant increase in the recruitment

of FTFs from Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia. Operating from Ituri following growing pressure from military intervention from Uganda and the DRC in Beni, Da'esh enhanced coordination of ADF activities since September 2020, predominantly through Telegram. While Telegram is being used by ADF to communicate with fighters and operatives, a Telegram group has been created promoting ADF attacks, enhancing Da'esh propaganda.⁴⁰

In addition to the growing manifestation of terrorist activities in the DRC, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique on 1 October 2021, the Government of Rwanda announced the arrest of 13 individuals for planning terrorist attacks in Kigali. The suspects were all linked to ADF and acting under its guidance were arrested with bomb-making materials including explosives, wires, nails, and phones.⁴¹

In January 2022, Salim Mohamed Rashid (not listed) alias Chotara or Turki Salim, a Kenyan who joined ADF, was arrested with three other Kenyans in the DRC. Rashid was also active in recruiting youths from areas, such as the Masjid Musa Mosque to leave for the DRC by arranging temporary unofficial jobs as truckers. While in the DRC, Rashid appeared in a video released in June 2021 in which he beheaded a soldier of the *Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC)* or the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo while referencing Da'esh.

While other youths were confronted with limited opportunities, Rashid not only attended private secondary school in Mombasa, but he also graduated as one of the country's top students. Consequently, Rashid was selected to join the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology but was not interested. He then enrolled at the Technical University of Mombasa to study computer engineering but dropped out after the first year. After leaving to study computer engineering at Istanbul Kultur University in Turkey he was later deported on suspicion of joining ISIL after being found at the border headed to Syria.

38 See EAPCCO CTCoE Trend and Situation Report 2020.

39 Reuters. "Islamic State claims its first Congo attack". 19 April 2019. <https://af.reuters.com/article/drcNews/idAFL5N2206SQ>.

40 United Nations Security Council. "Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities." S2022/547, 15 July 2022.

41 Africa News. "Rwanda arrests 13 suspected of plotting 'terrorist' attacks" 1 October 2021. <https://www.africanews.com/2021/10/01/rwanda-arrests-13-suspected-of-plotting-terrorist-attacks/#:~:text=Rwandan%20police%20said%20on%20Friday,Police%20said%20in%20a%20statement>.

Rashid fled to Mozambique and later sneaked into the DRC. Rashid was also in contact with Richard Lazarus Kivatsi, and Alfan Ali Juma, who is said to be in Mozambique.⁴²

One of Rashid' fellow Kenyan fighters, Mahmoud Salim Mohamed (not listed), was in touch with Meddie Nkalubo (see above), who organized their journey to the ADF camps. In February, four Tanzanian members of ADF were arrested in Beni. In March, joint forces killed Abu Aden (deceased), a leading ADF commander of Somali origin, in a battle at Malulu, seven kilometers North-West of Boga town in the DRC. As a result of Operation Shujaa (joint operation between the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) and the FARDC) two Tanzanian fighters (including Nfurusii) were

killed at Kilunga near the Nobili-Busunga border crossing point.⁴³

Along with Nkalubo that is closely associated with Baluku, Ahmed Mohamood alias Jundi or Muwarabu (not listed), a Tanzanian national, was studying and preaching in Durban (South Africa) when he connected in late-2016 with Meddie via social media (whose online handle was "Puni" aka Punisher). In 2017, Jundi arrived in the ADF becoming a political commissar or Sheikh and a member of the ADF's courts. Indicating a post-Makulu's era of the ADF, Moses (the son of Jamil Makulu), who objected to Baluku taking control from his father in early 2019 was sentenced to death by beheading. According to an ADF reporter, Jundi personally carried out the execution.⁴⁴

6. KENYA



Violent extremism did not manifest in Kenya for the first time—when al-Shabaab was implicated in attacks on restaurants, public places, and churches since 2011. Instead, the most memorable manifestation of the growing threat of extremism since independence, can be traced back to the US embassy attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which were attributed to Al-Qaida on 7 August 1998. Kenya however, not only the target of al-Shabaab activities, but nationals from were also directly involved in recruiting Kenyan nationals to join al-Shabaab's ranks. Initially, after being radicalized those individuals left their respective countries to fight in Somalia. This trend also gradually changed to the extent that locally marginalized, radicalized and recruited individuals are being used to execute attacks in their own countries.

Turning back the clock to before the 1998 US embassy bombings, Usama bin Laden lived in Sudan between 1991 and 1996 (before he returned to Afghanistan), which provided him with an invaluable opportunity to exploit instability in Somalia (from 1991 onward) to establish Al-Qaida's East African cell. The latter has allowed Al-Qaida to operate in Nairobi since at least 1993, and in Mombasa since 1994.

To embed itself, Al-Qaida undertook several important activities. Initially Al-Qaida established safe houses for its members and sympathizers who were passing through. This facilitated not only illegal cross-border movement within the region but further meant that Kenya also served as a gateway for terrorists to the Gulf, the Middle East, and South Asia. To enhance its reach and legitimize its activities, Al-Qaida operatives opened diverse

42 Cyrus Ombati. "Kenya to seek extradition wanted terror suspect arrested in DRC." The Star, 30 January 2022. <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2022-01-30-kenya-to-seek-extradition-of-terror-suspect-nabbed-in-drc/>

43 Kenneth Kazibwe. "Uganda: UPDF Kills Somali ADF Commander in DRC As Another Is Arrested in Kampala." All Africa, 16 March 2022. <https://allafrica.com/stories/202203170159.html>

44 Candland, Tara, Adam Finck, Haroro J. Ingram, Laren Poole, Lorenzo Vidino, and Caleb Weiss. "The Islamic State in Congo." George Washington University (2021): 40.

small businesses and relief organizations to subsidize and conceal its activities. Furthermore, Al-Qaida operatives not only lived among Kenya's population, but also married into the local community, gaining acceptance.

The success of Al-Qaida's East African cell was further emphasized on 28 November 2002 when two suicide bombers targeted the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. Unlike in the case of the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, all the suspects involved in both attacks were Kenyan nationals, except for Abu Talha al-Sudani (a Sudanese national; deceased). Even the two suicide bombers, Fumo Mohamed Fumo (deceased), and Haruni Bamusa (deceased), were Kenyan nationals. During the subsequent investigation, another Kenyan national and suspect, Faizel Ali Nassor (deceased), killed himself and a Kenyan police officer when he detonated a hand grenade on 1 August 2003, rather than being arrested.⁴⁵

An important lesson to be learned is the patience of Al-Qaida in both Kenya and Tanzania. First starting with low key external actors building trust with vulnerable local communities to gradually embed itself without raising any suspicion from authorities.

Al-Shabaab functioned through proxies in Kenya. One of these proxies is the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC; not listed), which, when one analyzes its statements and messages, also serves as al-Shabaab's public relations arm in Kenya. The MYC, also known as Pumwani Muslim Youth and al-Hijra, mainly based in Nairobi has also developed a strong network of members and sympathizers in areas such as Eldoret, Garissa and Mombasa. The MYC was implicated in recruiting and financing al-Shabaab in Somalia. This allegation was confirmed on 10 January 2012 when the MYC declared that al-Shabaab had named Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali (UNSC listed; SOi.016) alias Abdul Fatah as its "Supreme Amir."

Ahmad Iman Ali was a central figure in forging the link between the MYC, al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida's East African cell.⁴⁶ Before this open alliance, the UN Monitoring Group, in its report in 2011, explained that Ahmad Iman Ali was a student of Sheikh

About Rogo Mohammed (UNSC listed; SOi.011), an open campaigner for al-Shabaab based in Mombasa (before his death on 27 August 2012). After Ali left for Mombasa, Rogo's main ally in the MYC was Sylvester Opiyo Osodo (not listed), alias "Musa," who heads MYC's resources center. Alongside Ahmad Iman Ali, Sheikh About Rogo was another central figure behind MYC's alliance with al-Shabaab, the radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan youths and the channeling of fighters to Somalia.

According to the United Nations Security Council, in its description of Rogo:⁴⁷

[A]s the main ideological leader of Al Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center, About Rogo Mohammed has used the extremist group as a pathway for radicalization and recruitment of principally Swahili speaking Africans for carrying out violent militant activity in Somalia. In a series of inspirational lectures between February 2009 and February 2012, About repeatedly called for the violent rejection of the Somali peace process. During these lectures, Rogo repeatedly called for the use of violence against both the United Nations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in Somalia and urged his audiences to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab's fight against the Kenyan Government. About Rogo Mohammed also offers guidance on the way Kenyan recruits joining al-Shabaab can evade detection by the Kenyan authorities, and which routes to follow when traveling from Mombasa and/or Lamu to Al-Shabaab strongholds in Somalia, notably Kismayo. He has facilitated the travels to Somalia of numerous Kenyan recruits for al-Shabaab. In September 2011, Rogo was recruiting individuals in Mombasa, Kenya for travel into Somalia, presumably to conduct terrorist operations. In September 2008, Rogo held a fundraising meeting in Mombasa to help finance al-Shabaab activities in Somalia.

45 Anneli Botha. *Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: radicalization from a political socialization perspective*. Lexington Books, 2016.

46 Op cit.

47 United Nations Security Council, "About Rogo Mohammed". 29 October 2014. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/materials/summaries/individual/about-rogo-mohammed>

Capitalizing on local feelings of marginalization and frustrations, violent extremist elements managed to establish a network through Kenya to neighboring countries and beyond. In addition of being a target of terrorism with reference to the Westgate, Garissa University and DusitD2 attacks to name only a few, Kenya also played a central role in the planning and execution of the Kampala 2010 attacks.

While links between Kenyan nationals and Al-Qaida and Al-Shabaab is clearly established, involvement in the activities and enhancement of ISIL requires closer attention. While ISIL managed to recruit individuals from within the region to leave their countries of origin to Syria and Iraq, as elsewhere in the world, in May 2016, Kenyan and Ugandan authorities arrested Mohamed Abdi Ali (not listed), alias Abu Fida'a, Nuseiba Mohammed Haji his wife in Uganda and her friend Fatuma Mohammed Hanshi (not listed) for allegedly planning to use anthrax as a biological weapon.⁴⁸

All three studied medicine together at Kampala International University before returning to Kenya where Abu Fida'a was appointed as an intern at Wote Hospital. Additionally, Farah Dagane Hassan (deceased) and Hiishi Ahmed Ali (deceased), both medical interns, were also suspected to be involved in the plot but managed to flee to Libya after they learnt of the arrest of Abu Fida'a. Both died in a US airstrike in March 2017. Abudullah Adulqani Allin (not listed), a medical practitioner based in Malindi was arrested in October 2016. Two additional

interns, Shukri Mohammed Yerrow (graduated from Saratov Medical University in Russia in 2015; not listed) and Abdulrazak Abdinuur (not listed) at Malindi hospital who were also arrested were believed to have been planning to travel to Puntland to join ISIL. Abu Fida'a was also linked to Samatar Ullah (not listed), a UK-based Islamic State supporter arrested in 2017.⁴⁹

In addition of ISIL plots, Waleed Ahmed Zein (not listed), a Kenyan national, travelled to Uganda in early 2017 where he met with ADF representatives. In 2018, according to the US Department of the Treasury, Zein established:⁵⁰

"An intricate [Da'esh] financial facilitation network spanning Europe, the Middle East, the Americas and Eastern Africa. Between 2017 and early 2018, Zein moved over \$150,000 through his complex network. Zein also used an associate to conduct similar transactions including receiving money from around the world, primarily via hawala systems. Funds were then sent to [Da'esh] fighters in Syria, Libya, and Central Africa. Zein and his associates received instructions, money, and account information from an intermediary in an attempt to evade police surveillance."

Zein, along with an associate, Halima Adan Ali (not listed) was arrested by Kenyan police in July 2018 on terrorism financing charges (ten counts of facilitating acts of terrorism).⁵¹

48 Alexander Smith. "Kenya Police Say They Foiled ISIS-Linked Plot to Unleash Anthrax Attack." NBC News, 4 May 2016. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/kenya-police-say-they-foiled-isis-linked-plot-unleash-anthrax-n567721>

49 The Global Strategy Network. "Islamic State in East Africa." European Institute of Peace, September 2018. https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Report_IS-in-East-Africa_October-2018-3.pdf

50 US Department of the Treasury. "Treasury Sanctions East African Facilitator of Intricate ISIS Financial Network." 7 September 2018. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm476>

51 Kevin J. Kelley. "US Sanctions Waleed Zein, the Kenyan accused of financing Isis." Nation, 3 July 2020. <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/diaspora/diaspora-news/us-sanctions-waleed-zein-the-kenyan-accused-of-financing-isis-85158>

7. TANZANIA



Even before the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, Tanzania (as any other country) has a unique set of vulnerabilities that physically manifest in attacks. Although some can be attributed to political divisions and rivalry there also exists a feeling of marginalization and frustration between mainland Tanzania and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. While current attention is directed towards the Mtwara, the most southern part of Tanzania, bordering Mozambique, it is equally necessary to be aware of existing vulnerabilities that play an important factor in the radicalization and recruitment of FTFs to other conflict areas. It is particularly important to note that both Khalfan Khamis Mohamed (not listed) and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (UNSC listed; QDi.028) that were Al-Qaida operatives in the 1998 bombings originated from Zanzibar.

After the 1998 attacks, a bombing campaign began in January 2004 with an attack on a truck delivering alcohol, followed by the burning-down of a Catholic church.⁵² Since the beginning of March 2004, the pace and intensity of attacks spiraled, with attacks on a police, an electricity sub-station, and a church school bus. During the weekend of 20 and 21 March 2004 several explosive devices detonated in Zanzibar, including a homemade bomb blast at the residence of Zubeir Ali Maulid, a cabinet minister in Zanzibar, and the home of Zanzibar's Mufti, Harith bin Khelef. A grenade was also hurled during the same campaign at the Mercury restaurant that landed on the dinner table of a British diplomat but failed to detonate. An American diplomat and about twenty-five foreigners were also dining in the restaurant at the time of the incident. The primary suspect of the recent number of incidents were supporters of the Society for Islamic Awareness (UAMSHO; not listed), a religious movement which clashed with the Tanzanian

government since it appointed Khelef as Mufti over a religious leader who had been chosen by the islanders.⁵³

Nevertheless, attacks continue in Zanzibar, Arusha, Kashasha, and Tanga, on a low scale and not attracting international attention. In the southern part of Tanzania, between 2015 and 2018, an underground group attacked and abducted government officers, police, and military personnel. Other criminal acts included poaching, bank, and mobile money shop robberies. Police actions, including enforced curfews, did not prevent attacks, which spread south towards Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Security services and political leaders never linked the attacks to violent extremism or terrorism; however, the US Department of State considered them to be "terrorist incidents."⁵⁴

Unorthodox, fanatical doctrines began to gain popularity in Pwani at least a decade before the attacks in Tanzania began. A radical group called *Walokole wa Kiislamu* ("Islamic revivalist") emerged, using radical techniques, which caused conflict in mosques and led to their separation from mainstream mosques. The group has been linked to Ansar al-Sunna (UNSC listed; QDe.098), after several arrests in Mozambique.⁵⁵

Ansar al-Sunna started as a religious organization in Cabo Delgado in 2015, and only later became militarized. Its early members were followers of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the radical Kenyan cleric who was shot dead in 2012. Continuing Rogo's work, the early Ansar al-Sunna members first settled in Kibiti, in southern Tanzania, before entering Mozambique.⁵⁶ Local Muslim and Christian community members were first to express concern after the group started to take control of local mosques, or establishing their own, and preaching

52 O Owen. "Explosives cause widespread damage in Tanzania." WMRC Daily Analysis, 25 March 2004.

53 Reuters. "Police hold Muslim militants over Zanzibar blasts." 22 March 2004.

54 Dang, Lillian. *Violent Extremism and Community Policing in Tanzania*. United States Institute of Peace, 2019.

55 Intelyse LLC. "Southern African Jihad: The Cabo Delgado Insurgency."

56 Sunguta West. "Ansar al-Sunna: A New Militant Islamist Group Emerges in Mozambique." *Terrorism Monitor* Volume 16 Issue 12 (2018). <https://jamestown.org/program/ansar-al-sunna-a-new-militant-islamist-group-emerges-in-mozambique/>

an anti-state ideology and a strict version of Islam in contradiction to local values.⁵⁷

Despite local feelings of marginalization and frustration provided the backdrop, influences from Kenya and Tanzania facilitated the creation of ASWJ. Since Rogo recorded his messages in Swahili, Swahili also facilitated the integration of FTFs from Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. Member States have noted that the use of Swahili makes it easy for foreign terrorist fighters to communicate with one another and to assimilate within groups in the region.⁵⁸

Kenyan nationals fleeing from Kenya after the death of Rogo to Tanzania where they congregated with like-minded Tanzanian nationals in the Kibiti area of Rufiji district in southern Tanzania by early 2015. Following a similar trend than witnessed in Northeastern and Coastal parts of Kenya⁵⁹, members of “*walokole wa kiislamu*” (not listed), or Islamic revivalists made attempts to take over existing mosques in Kibiti and nearby areas as well as building separate mosques. Especially the youth was vulnerable to the new ideas presented by the group that placed an emphasis on the need to cleanse the area of “impure religious practices”.

Furthermore, youths began calling elders “kaffirs” or unbelievers, while some madrassa teachers begun to prevent their students from attending secular schools, saying they were illegitimate. In addition to growing intra-communal conflict between the younger, more extreme with the older and moderate generation the potential for violence escalated with attacks directed against government, the police and civilians till the Tanzanian military was deployed in 2017. In response, members of the Kibiti-group (not listed) as it is being referred to left for Mozambique.⁶⁰

Between 2015 and 2016, Tanga (most north-eastern region of Tanzania, bordering Kenya) attracted attention of Tanzanian security forces. Starting with attacks on three different police stations during which attackers seized guns and ammunition in February 2015, police followed the perpetrators to the Amboni caves. After a 48-hour gun battle, the Defence Force was deployed bringing the situation under control.⁶¹ During the same period, Ahl Al Kahf (not listed) or “People of the Cave” suspected to be based in the in the Tanga region released a video via social media in which it claimed to be a branch of ISIL.⁶² The video also indicated that attackers are prepared to increase their influence in Mtwara, Lindi, Mwanza and Dodoma Regions.

On 30 May 2016, masked attackers killed eight residents of Kibatini village in Mzizima, approximately 55km from Tanga, were killed, including the chairman and several members of the village committee. Community members referred to the attackers as members of al-Shabaab (a common reference to violent extremists).⁶³ Recalling above events, the community also referred to a violent extremist organization who was recruiting children and young people into military-style training inside in the caves, but also some mosques and madrassas in the rural western districts of Tanga.⁶⁴

Earlier, on 7 October 2013, Tanzanian Police arrested 11 men ranging in age from teenagers through their late 30s in Mtwara Region Makolionga Forest. The police reported the men as followers of a violent extremist imam who had been forced out of a mosque in Zanzibar and another in Mtwara. He and his followers reportedly conducted unarmed training and possessed al-Shabaab propaganda. Local villagers informed the police about the suspicious activities of the group. During the same year, on 23 October, following the killing of the Officer in Charge of the police station in the village

57 Simone Haysom. “Where terror capitalizes on corruption.” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 23 April 2018. <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/northern-mozambique-where-terror-capitalizes-on-corruption/>

58 United Nations Security Council. “Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.” S/2022/547, 15 July 2022.

59 Anneli Botha. “Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism.” Institute for Security Studies Paper 245 (2013): 28.

60 Intelyse LLC. “Southern African Jihad” p. 7.

61 Erick Kabendera. “Tanzania on Security Alert after Police Attacked,” The East African, 21 February 2015. <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-on-security-alert-after-police-attacked--1332796>

62 Gabrielle Reid. “Militants Rising: Islamic State’s East African Ambitions.” Daily Maverick, 10 January 2017. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-01-10-militants-rising-islamic-states-east-african-ambitions/>

63 The Citizen. “Assailants hack eight Tanga residents to death.” 31 May 2016. <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/assailants-hack-eight-tanga-residents-to-death--2556774>

64 Lillian Dang. “Violent Extremism and Community Policing in Tanzania.” United States Institute of Peace, no 442, March 2019.

of Lwande, police learned of a violent extremist group that ran a madrassa. Police went to the madrassa and rescued a numerous woman and children but recovered violent extremist materials. Parents from the local village entrusted their children to the madrassa so they could obtain an education and were unaware of the violent extremist teachings.⁶⁵

Logistical support from Tanzania received on land and via maritime routes into the base of Mocimboa da Praia were recorded with specific reference to fuel and other supplies. It is however important to note that the situation changed drastically since Rwandan forces were deployed based on discussions with returnees in Cabo Delgado. However, between 14 and 28 October 2020, launched a series of attacks directed at the villages of Michenjele (Tan-

dahimba), Mihambwe and Nanyamba in Mtwara. (not listed) claimed responsibility for the attacks, in one of its Telegram accounts in which said, "its fighters had attacked an army barracks in the village a day earlier, killing a number of personnel and capturing weapons and ammunition."⁶⁶

The attack on 25 August 2021 in Dar es-Salaam in which Hamza Mohammed (not listed) shot police officers with a pistol at a city intersection before taking their rifles and heading to the nearby French embassy where he shot the security guard also divert attention to the possibility of lone wolf attacks after being radicalized online. According to police investigators, the gunman accessed extremist content from social media pages depicting terror acts by al-Shabaab and Da'esh and were in contact with external actors before the attack.⁶⁷

8. MOZAMBIQUE



Initially, Ansaru-Sunna was legally registered in Cabo Delgado, before the group built new mosques and preached a stricter form of Islam across the province. Becoming more extreme in its views, the group was also known as Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama'a (ASWJ; not listed), as well as Swahili Sunna (Swahili path). The latter was initially focused on religious debates, religious practice, and opposition to the secular state. In 2010 the villagers of Nhadole in the Balama district decided to get rid of the group and destroyed its mosque. Group members fled to the town of Mucojo, in the district of Macomia. There tensions flared with the local population and authorities. ASWJ members fled to the town of Mucojo (Macomia). While in Mucojo police were called in 2015 when the organization tried to forcefully impose an alcohol ban in the

town. This was followed by the fatal stabbing of a police officer.⁶⁸

Facilitating radicalization into violent extremism, some Mozambican clerics have been exposed to the rhetoric of violent extremist scholars. It is important to note that historically Mozambican clerics have been trained in Tanzania for more than a century and exchanges have taken place for longer, among religious communities on both sides of the border without the introduction of intolerance and violence.⁶⁹

The ideology and activities of the organization caused the Islamic Council of Mozambique to intervene. According to Nassurulahe Dulá, the leader of the Islamic Council in Pemba: "They forbid

65 United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 - Tanzania, 30 April 2014, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/536229b511.html>

66 George Obulutsa. "Militants from Mozambique staged deadly attack in Tanzania, police say" Reuters, 23 October 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-security-mozambique-idUSKBN2781PB>

67 Africa News. "Tanzania: Gunman who killed four people last month was a terrorist.". 2 September 2021. <https://www.africanews.com/2021/09/02/tanzania-gunman-who-killed-four-people-last-month-was-a-terrorist/>

68 Eric Morier-Genoud. "How a local Mozambique Islamic group became Africa's latest terror threat." Quartz Africa, 24 February 2019. <https://qz.com/africa/1558111/mozambiques-islamist-threat-al-shabaab-has-roots-in-tanzania/>

69 Intelyse LLC. "Southern African Jihad: The Cabo Delgado Insurgency"

children to go to official school, to go to hospitals, they urge residents not to have any documentation and to defy the police authority".⁷⁰ These rules revoked memory of the precursor to Boko Haram (UNSC listed; QDe.138) in Nigeria. During the end of 2016, the government ceded to the demands of the Islamic Council of Mozambique and began arresting leaders of the split off group. Those arrested were accused of engaging in disinformation, rejecting state authority, refusing to send their children to school, and using knives for self-defense purposes. These arrests had an impact on the use of violence and militarization of the ASWJ.⁷¹

The leader, Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan (not listed) alias Abu Yasir Hassan or Abu Qasim came from Tanzania in the Rufiji district as one of the six districts of the Pwani Region of Tanzania. Since people in that area did not accept the teachings and were not interested in joining the militant group, Sheikh Ambasse (not listed) and Sheikh Nguvu (not listed) travelled to Mozambique, specifically to Moçimboa da Praia where they convinced Bonomade Machude Omar alias Abu Sulayfa Muhammad (not listed) and Ibn Omar (Mozambican national; not listed), and later senior military commander of ISIS-Mozambique to join the fight. According to Antony J. Blinken, the US Secretary of State in the designation of ISIS-Mozambique, Machude heads the Military and External Affairs Departments for ISIS-Mozambique and serves as the senior commander and lead coordinator for all attacks conducted by the group in northern Mozambique, as well as the lead facilitator and communications mouthpiece for the group.⁷²

After Machude accepted to join, they took him to Egypt where he was trained and then to the DRC where he was hailed as one of the best militants trained at that camp. After he returned to Mozambique, he focused on the coastal zone of the north building mosques for young people. Using this

strategy, he convinced many young people to join him, most of them were fishermen and unemployed. Following the pledge of allegiance, ASWJ became a part of ISCAP while continuing to attract recruits from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. In the latter part of 2019, Ansar Al-Sunna in Mozambique was added to ISCAP.⁷³

According to Abu Yasir Hassan since he frequented the central mosque of Milamba, the main goal of the conflict was to establish a country free of secular laws. They tried to initially establish it in Tanzania but did not find sufficient support from Tanzanian Muslims and were confronted by security forces, driving them to Mozambique.⁷⁴ With strongholds in Macomia, Mucojo, Pemba and Palma, of particular concern was the interception of a recruiter in Nampula who approached parents with the promise to educate their children as witnessed in Tanzania and other countries in the region. Recognizing socioeconomic challenges, parents struggling financially is understandably tempted to send their children to schools for free adding to the growing concern that these schools are often very isolated and not being monitored, especially when it comes to the curricula being presented.

According to the fifteenth report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama 'a foreign terrorist fighters are mostly of the Tanzanian and Kenyan origin, but also include nationals of Somalia, the DRC, and Uganda. Further, on 1 April 2022, a video was released purportedly depicting members of ASWJ renewing their pledge of allegiance to the new leader of Da'esh, Abu al-Hassan.⁷⁵ Despite the national origins of the organizations, according to one Member State (not identified) in S/2022/547 operations in Mozambique were planned and commanded from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁷⁶

70 DW. "Northern Mozambique targeted by insurgents with a radical view of Islam, says Muslim leader." 11 October 2017. <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/norte-de-mo%C3%A7ambique-alvo-de-insurgentes-com-vis%C3%A3o-radical-do-isl%C3%A3o-diz-l%C3%ADder-mu%C3%A7ulmano/a-40910044>

71 Raquel Loureiro and António Cascais. "Attack in Mocimboa da Praia was an "isolated case". DW, 16 October 2017. <https://www.dw.com/pt-002/ataque-em-moc%C3%ADmboa-da-praia-ter%C3%A1-sido-caso-isolado/a-40977442>

72 US Department of State. "Designations of ISIS-Mozambique, JNIM, and al-Shabaab Leaders" 6 August 2021. <https://www.state.gov/designations-of-isis-mozambique-jnim-and-al-shabaab-leaders/>

73 Reliefweb, Growing Insurgency in Mozambique Poses Danger to Southern Africa, 26 March 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/growing-insurgency-mozambique-poses-danger-southern-africa>; Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Evolution and Escalation of the Islamic State Threat to Mozambique, 13 April 2021. Available at: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/04/the-evolution-and-escalation-of-the-islamic-state-threat-to-mozambique/>

74 TopicWorx. Mozambique Assessment. 23 July 2019.

75 United Nations Security Council. "Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat." S/2022/576, 26 July 2022

76 United Nations Security Council. "Thirtieth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2610 (2021) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities." S/2022/547, 15 July 2022.

9. SOUTH AFRICA



South Africa has long been regarded as a haven after being implicated in numerous terrorist plots and attacks. Over the years, counter-terrorism practitioners within Eastern Africa have raised concern over the growing links between South Africa and terror attacks within the region.⁷⁷ Despite the country not being placed on the same level of threat than other countries discussed in this report, South Africa needs to be taken into consideration when discussing the trans-regionalization of terrorism in relation to Southern and Eastern Africa. Although South Africa found itself in the middle of other plots and acts of terrorism elsewhere, the focus of this section will only refer to recent developments in relation to the two regions being discussed.

South Africa has become an attractive country for recruitment for causes abroad. Breaking the traditional perception that the most vulnerable come from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, Da'esh managed to recruit individuals coming from average income families and therefore reduces the financial burden on the organization. In this context, most of the recruits can organize their own travel arrangements, though some still require financial and technical support.

The link between South African nationals and the instability in Cabo Delgado came to light in July 2016 as 23-year-old twins, Brandon-Lee (not listed) and Tony-Lee Thulsie (not listed) were arrested linked to plots to launch attacks against the US Embassy, UK High Commission, the South Africa Zionist Federation, the King David High School, and arms manufacturer Denel. They had been on the radar of the Hawks since 2015 after they had tried to

leave the country twice, first through OR Tambo International Airport and again through Mozambique to join Da'esh in Syria. Associated with the Thulsie investigation Renaldo Smith (not listed) was linked to the residence where the twins were believed to be staying.⁷⁸ Smith during the search revealed that Tony-Lee was "Simba".

Simba was also the alias the twins used on numerous posts on various Facebook accounts pledging their support for Da'esh. Further investigations also established that Simba communicated with a high-ranking Da'esh member, asking for permission to conduct a terror attack in South Africa. At the time, Smith agreed to turn state witness. On 15 August, Smith said he was forced into giving that evidence and is trying to recant it. It was shortly after this hearing that Smith jumped the fence into Mozambique to again feature in a photo as part of a statement Da'esh claimed – for the first time – that it has been responsible for an attack in northern Mozambique (after two years of attacks in the Cabo Delgado)⁷⁹ Although Smith was not identified by name, he and three other fighters, armed with a variety of weapons, stood in front of an Da'esh flag. Since the Thulsie case it is unknown how many South African nationals may have left the country for Cabo Delgado.⁸⁰ With Smith, Mohammed Suliman (not listed), accompanied by 15 others, left South Africa for Mozambique in 2018. Shortly after his arrival, Suliman appeared in a picture pledging allegiance to ISIL (according to indications Suliman was killed in Mozambique).⁸¹

South African nationals can also be involved in terrorism financing with the links to other countries,

77 For instance, a recent EAPCCO CTCoE Issue Paper discusses the story of Mahmood Mughisha and his journey from South Africa – see: EAPCCO CTCoE Issue Paper 4/2022: Lessons Learned from the Deradicalization of Mahmood Mugisha https://eapcco-ctcoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/EAPCCO-CTCoE_Issue-Paper-4-2022.pdf

78 Christian Jokinen. "Islamic State's South African Fighters in Mozambique: The Thulsie Twins Case." *Terrorism Monitor* Volume: 18 Issue: 20 (2020). <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-states-south-african-fighters-in-mozambique-the-thulsie-twins-case/>

79 Jasmine Opperman. "Islamic State shifts its gaze to southern Africa – time to start getting worried." *Daily Maverick*, 5 June 2019. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-05-islamic-state-shifts-its-gaze-to-southern-africa-time-to-start-getting-worried/>

80 Club of Mozambique. "Chilling links between Mozambique ISIS and South Africa – report." 3 September 2020. <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/chilling-links-between-mozambique-isis-and-south-africa-report-170283/>

81 Christian Jokinen. "Islamic State's South African Fighters in Mozambique: The Thulsie Twins Case." *Terrorism Monitor* Volume: 18 Issue: 20 (2020). <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-states-south-african-fighters-in-mozambique-the-thulsie-twins-case/>

particularly Kenya and Somalia. Dutch intelligence authorities in July 2022 arrested a man – identified as Mohammed Ghorshid (not listed) – trying to buy bitcoins (a cryptocurrency often used for terrorist financing) with a credit card belonging to Rachel Saunders. Ghorshid was on the watchlist of Dutch intelligence because of his Da'esh links. The credit card connected Ghorshid with Sayefudeen Del Vecchio (not listed) and Fatima Patel (not listed). According to Dutch investigators Ghorshid was also in contact with Abu Fida, also known as Mohammed Abdi Ali (not listed) the highest ranking Da'esh spokesman in Africa. Abu Fida was arrested in Kenya in 2016 and according to information from the FBI, received direct instructions from the ISIS leadership in Syria. According to Dutch prosecutors, Ghorshid knew two of the Saunders' kidnappers in South Africa and worked with a Somali-based suspect.⁸²

Another example where terrorism financing links to another country and is part of the preparation of a terrorist attack is the Dusit attack in Nairobi, Kenya on 15 and 16 January 2019. In August of that year Kenyan investigators – Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), a Criminal Intelligence Unit officer attached to Safaricom and a prosecutor from the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions – were in South Africa to follow-up in multiple transactions accumulating to an estimated \$22 million transferred from a bank in Cape Town to a Kenyan bank, before being withdrawn via mobile money at various outlets.

One of the leaders of the Dusit attack had registered 70 mobile money transfer numbers from which he and his accomplices would withdraw money for purchase of weapons, pay for surveillance of intended target, purchase or hire vehicles to move around and pay for rent in the places they lived in and possibly bribe authorities. Investigations revealed that Hassan Abdi Nur (not listed) one of the suspects had 52 M-Pesa agency accounts (mobile money) received money over three months from South Africa which was later withdrawn at a bank in Eastleigh, before it was wired to Somalia.⁸³ Of the 52 M-Pesa accounts, 47 of them were registered between October and December 2018, each with a SIM card used in two handsets that were geo-located to Eastleigh area, Nairobi.⁸⁴ He used different IDs to register the SIM cards.

Kenyan nationals, one living in Cape Town and another who is said to be a refugee in Pretoria, were implicated as part of a terror sleeper cell and a major financier of al-Shabaab. Further linking al-Shabaab in Kenya with South Africa, Kenyan investigations also revealed that one of the biggest local recruiters for the group was a man from Malindi, with vast business interests in the South African city. The respected businessman relocated to South Africa in search of asylum after members of an al-Shabaab cell composed of his former recruits was located and neutralized by ATPU officers in January 2016.⁸⁵

82 AFP "Dutch jihadist suspect 'involved' in South African kidnapping – reports" News24, 27 August 2018 <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/dutch-jihadist-suspect-involved-in-south-african-kidnapping-reports-20180827>

83 Fred Oluoch "EA security chiefs meet over common approach to terror attacks, piracy" The East African, 21 September 2019 <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/How-westgate-attack-jolted-region-police-chiefs-into-action/4552908-5281736-4wqx5xz/index.html>

84 Cyrus Ombati "Lead investigator in dusitD2 Hotel terror attack collapses, dies at JKIA" The Standard, 1 December 2019 <https://www.sde.co.ke/local-news/2001351658/lead-investigator-in-dusitd2-hotel-terror-attack-collapses-dies-at-jkia>

85 Kamore Maina and Daniel Wesangula "Revealed: Sh2.3b funds link to Dusit attack" The Standard, 25 August 2019 <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001339358/revealed-sh2-3b-funds-link-to-dusit-attack>

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

Prevention and a proactive approach are the key elements

Security agencies, policy makers, practitioners and analyst alike urgently need to develop and put in place measures – while reactively addressing the manifestation of the threat – **to proactively prevent the spread of the threat in communities and countries not visibly impacted before it manifests.**

Turning the tide against violent extremism and terrorism therefore requires a proactive mindset in being informed about developments within countries not yet visibly impacted, while enhancing cooperation between countries within the same region and between regions.

Enhance international cooperation

The first step is to enhance cooperation between neighboring countries within the same regional block through information sharing, cross-border initiatives, and regional training. While this is the first step, it is important to turn the boundaries against terrorist by enhancing cross-regional cooperation between governments and law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. This needs to include countries not yet directly impacted by the visible manifestation of terrorism as these countries are being used to facilitate, plan, and execute acts of terrorism within both regions and beyond.

Cross-border investigation and prosecution

Terrorism-related investigations are seldom limited to the jurisdiction of only one country and therefore require the assistance of neighboring countries. While a lot can be accomplished through unofficial channels, formal mutual legal assistance also has its place in an investigation. Especially when the case goes to court, necessary care needs to be taken that the correct procedures were followed. The benchmark at the back of the mind of every person involved in the case should answer a critical question: **“Will this evidence be admissible in court?”**

Recognizing the practical implications that countries do not only share a border but also strong family, economic, and cultural, and historical ties which cement the bond between these countries that have real consequences. This requires engaging border communities on border management and understanding their perceptions on defense and security forces operating at the border, to build trust and allow them to actively engage in a holistic approach in addressing the following border security concerns and risk occasioned by terrorist activities:

- Knowledge of the nationalities of the people crossing the border
- Understanding of measures taken to secure the border and categories of people with criminal activities
- Knowledge of terrorists' activities and community actions to combat terrorism
- Knowledge on established communication and security mechanisms in place, existence of intermediary stakeholders between authorities and border communities.

Enhance border security

While cooperation is key in the fight against any transnational crime, especially terrorism and organized crime, **enhancing cooperation on border control is particularly important.** For newly aligned organizations to reap the benefits, cross border movement will be a given prerequisite to facilitate the movement of fighters (FTFs), trainers, especially from the outside into the country and region considered to be the base of operations, equipment (firearms and explosives), financial means (including through criminal networks), etc. In addition to these tangible needs and means, security forces should be equally aware of the virtual space and the capitalization of mobile communication, the internet, and social media.

Increased and expanded capacity building initiatives

Counterterrorism investigations is a very specialized field, yet only a small minority of police officers are trained, that often only become involved much later in the investigation. Instead, it is military officers and first responders, including station-level police officers that will first interact with victims and evidence.

Cases will however in the end be win or lost based on the treatment of this evidence. Learning from the past experiences in Africa and beyond, militaries need to be trained in the collection and preservation of evidence that can be used in later court proceedings. Addressing this need the UNODC developed a course on battlefield evidence and how to strengthen cooperation between criminal justice actors and the military.

The following are some valuable resources and initiatives on the battlefield evidence:

- **The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) “Guidelines to facilitate the use and admissibility as evidence in national criminal courts of information collected, handled, preserved and shared by the military to prosecute terrorist offences”, developed within the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Task Force Working Group on Criminal-Justice, Legal Responses and Countering the Financing of Terrorism;**
- **Non-Binding Guiding Principles on Use of Battlefield Evidence in Civilian Criminal Proceedings, co-produced by the United State Departments of State, Justice, and Defense;**
- **NATO Policy on Battlefield Evidence;**
- **The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) Abuja Recommendations on the Collection, Use and Sharing of Evidence for Purposes of Criminal Prosecution of Terrorist Suspects;**
- **The EUROJUST 2020 Memorandum on Battlefield Evidence;**
- **The Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism Draft Recommendation CM/Rec (202XX) XX of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the use of information collected in conflict zones as evidence in criminal proceedings related to terrorist offences.**
- **Position of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism on the Use of “Battlefield” or Military Produced Evidence in the Context of Investigations or Trials Involving Terrorism Offences, April 2021.**

In addition to equipping military personnel on the treatment of evidence (and suspects) there is also a need to expand this type of capacity building initiatives to first responders, intelligence officials, while working with the prosecution authorities, counterterrorism police officers and even the judiciary.



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